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Gary J. Simson • 
Any observer of the Senate's debate of the Bork nomination 
could not help but be struck by the broad disagreement among Sen-
ators as to the appropriate standards for confirming a Supreme 
Court nominee. To what extent, if any, should Senators be influ-
enced by their approval or disapproval of votes that the nominee is 
likely to cast on the Court? Are Senators obliged to defer to the 
President and confirm the nominee unless they have serious doubts 
about competence or integrity? On these and other questions of 
proper standards, consensus was obviously lacking. I 
• Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, Yale University. I 
am grateful to Kevin Clermont, Bob Kent, and Russell Osgood for their helpful comments on 
an earlier draft of this article. Special thanks go to Rosalind Simson, once again my toughest 
but most supportive critic. 
l. The following excerpts from speeches delivered consecutively on the Senate floor 
provide a good sense of the divergence of views: 
Mr. GRAMM. . . . I have always felt no matter who was in the White House, 
if he sent a nominee to the Congress for confirmation in the Senate, I ought consider 
two aspects. No. 1, the person's experience and qualifications; I think it is reason-
able to vote against somebody if you think they are not qualified. 
The second thing I think we have a right and an obligation to look at is integ-
rity. Does this person have integrity? ... 
Judge Bork has not been attacked because he lacks ability or because he lacks 
integrity. He has been attacked by exactly the same groups who opposed Ronald 
Reagan's election in 1980 and who opposed Ronald Reagan's election in 1984, 
groups trying to win in the Senate what they could not win at the ballot box .... 
[Judge Bork] is probably not going to be confirmed basically because of a philo-
sophical dispute, a political dispute, concerning the direction of the Supreme Court. 
I think this injection of politics hurts the process .... 
Mr. LEAHY. . . . [T]he central issue in this nomination is the question of 
Judge Bark's judicial philosophy: His approach to the Constitution, and to the role 
of the courts in discerning and enforcing its commands .... 
After the nomination was made, we heard from some of the supporters of this 
nomination that the Senate should not consider Judge Bark's judicial philosophy. 
We were told that our only job was to make sure that the nominee was competent 
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The debate on the Bork nomination may have been unique in 
the clarity with which this broad disagreement on standards 
emerged.z It was hardly unique, however, as an instance in which 
such disagreement existed. With no express guidance in the Consti-
tution as to applicable standards-the pertinent constitutional pro-
vision says only that the President "shall nominate, and by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of 
the supreme Court"3-Senators often have buttressed their argu-
ments for or against a nominee with competing versions of the ap-
propriate standards for confirmation. 4 
and law-abiding. Any further inquiry, we were told, would be ideological, and 
somehow improper. 
That is a tough argument for anybody to make. The proponents of that argu-
ment want us to ignore 200 years of constitutional history. That history tells us that 
the Senate has often considered and debated the judicial philosophy of nominees to 
the Supreme Court. In fact, after those debates, one-fifth of these nominees have 
not been confirmed. 
133 CoNG. RE.c. Sl4,788-91, Sl4,793 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). 
2. See generally H. ABRAHAM, JumcES AND PRESIDENTS: A PoLmCAL HISTORY 
OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME CoURT (2d ed. 1985). 
3. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
4. Compare, for example, the arguments made on the Senate floor by Senators Norris 
and Allen on the nomination of John J. Parker: 
Mr. NORRIS. . . . When we are passing on a judge, therefore, we not only 
ought to know whether he is a good lawyer, not only whether he is honest-and I 
admit that this nominee possesses both of these qualifications-but we ought to 
know how he approaches these great questions of human liberty. This is the great 
tribunal that Roosevelt said and that everybody knows leads the way in constitu-
tional questions for the change of our Government, the greatest lawmaking body on 
earth, with power that no one can overrule or override, whose word is final, whose 
decrees are final, and from whose word and judgment there is no appeal. 
72 CoNG. RE.c. 8192 (1930). 
Mr. ALLEN .... I am going to vote for Judge Parker's confirmation because I 
believe it is my conscientious duty thus to do. 
Ah, what kind of a Supreme Court shall we have presently if we are going to 
select judges to sit upon that bench according to ... the preconceived notions we 
possess touching the doctrines we should like to have them believe? 
What are we going to do in this body presently when a nomination for the 
Supreme Court comes in and we are told, "The future of the eighteenth amendment 
depends upon the interpretation of the Supreme Court, and this man is not wet 
enough or that man is not dry enough?" 
72 CoNG. RE.c. 8435 (1930). Consider also the defense of nominee G. Harrold Carswell that 
Senator Hruska offered to a radio interviewer and Senator Kennedy's response on the Senate 
floor: 
Even if [as has been claimed] he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges 
and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and 
a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and 
stuff like that there. 
R. HARRIS, DECISION 110 (1971) (quoting Senator Hruska). 
Mr. KENNEDY .... Story, Holmes, Cardozo, Frankfurter-that is the stan-
dard of excellence to which all Presidents must strive. And if, as one Senator ar-
gued, "we can't have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and stuff like 
that there," then the least we can do is to seek to come as close as possible. The fact 
that we cannot find a Frankfurter is no excuse for nominating a Carswell. 
116 CoNG. REc. 10,365 (1970). For discussion of these two unsuccessful nominations, seeR. 
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Commentators have entered the fray with a wide variety of so-
lutions. Mitchell McConnell, for example, treats Supreme Court 
appointments as basically a matter of presidential prerogative.5 In 
his view, the Senate is obliged to confirm any nominee who is not 
patently unfit. Senators should be satisfied if the nominee appears 
"competent"6 and has attained "some level of achievement or dis-
tinction. "7 In addition, they should recognize that "altering the 
ideological directions of the Supreme Court" is part of the "consti-
tutionally proper authority of the Executive in this area. "s 
Unlike McConnell, Laurence Tribe9 sees the Senate as an 
"equal partner" 10 in the appointment process. As understood by 
Tribe, this equal partnership apparently does not entail an inquiry 
into general qualifications materially more demanding than the one 
proposed by McConnell: Senators must decide whether the nomi-
nee "is, in some minimal sense, 'fit' to serve"; 11 they are "not bound 
to confirm manifestly inferior choices."12 For Tribe, however, this 
equal partnership does entail a two-part inquiry by each Senator 
into the views that the nominee holds and is apt to express on the · 
Court-a matter that McConnell regards as essentially only the 
HARRIS, supra (on Carswell); Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In Search of 
Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 567-72 (1986) (on Parker). 
5. McConnell, Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate Standard of Excellence, 59 
KY. L.J. 7 (1970). Along similar lines, see Fein, A Circumscribed Senate Confirmation Role, 
102 HARV. L. REv. 672 (1989). 
6. McConnell, supra note 5, at 33. 
7. /d. 
8. /d. at 32. According to McConnell, the Senate should not vote based on opposition 
to a nominee's views except in the "highly unlikely" event that the President selects someone 
of truly extreme views-"a nomination, for example, of a Communist or a member of the 
American Nazi Party." /d. 
In 1984 McConnell, who wrote the article discussed above while serving as chief legisla-
tive assistant to a Senator on the Judiciary Committee, was elected to the Senate. During the 
floor debate on the Bork nomination, Senator McConnell, Republican of Kentucky, asked 
that his 1970 article be printed in the Congressional Record and suggested that the article 
accurately described the role that the Senate should play. 133 CoNG. REc. 814,809, Sl4,819-
20 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987). He claimed to see in the "imminent defeat" of the Bork nomina-
tion, however, the clear emergence of a "new standard of review" -one providing that: 
We in the Senate are going to make our decision on any basis we darn well please, 
and if we object as a matter of philosophical persuasion to the direction the Presi-
dent is trying to move the Court, whether to the right or to the left, we can just 
stand up and say that and vote accordingly. No deliberation, no standards of excel-
lence, no standards at all. 
/d. at 814,820. Moreover, he stated "with no particular bitterness" that he planned to adhere 
in the future to this new standard because "it occurs to this Senator that if nobody else is 
applying [the] kind of strict, temperate standard [advocated in the 1970 article], then he 
should not either." /d. 
9. L. TRIBE, Goo SAVE THIS HONORABLE CoURT (1985). 
10. /d. at 132. 
11. /d. at 141. 
12. /d. at 85. 
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President's concern. First, Senators must determine whether the 
nominee's "vision of what the Constitution means" comes within 
the bounds of the "American vision."B They should not vote to 
confirm unless they find that the nominee's vision conforms to "our 
idea of a just society," not simply the idea of what "might be a 
'civilized' society in some people's eyes."t4 Second, Senators must 
determine whether the nominee's appointment "would upset the 
Court's equilibrium or exacerbate what [they regard] as an already 
excessive conservative or liberal bias."ts To vote to confirm in the 
face of such a detrimental effect would be "to abdicate a solemn 
trust."t6 
Henry Monaghan offers yet another conception of the Senate's 
role. According to Monaghan, "[w]e are better off recognizing a 
virtually unlimited political license in the Senate not to confirm 
nominees."t 7 Senators should feel free to vote against a Supreme 
Court nominee based on "statesmanship, prudence, common sense, 
and politics."ts Monaghan defends this "wholly political"t9 con-
ception of the Senate's role on two grounds. First, it is not possible 
13. /d. at 94, 96. 
14. /d. at 96. 
15. /d. at 107. 
16. /d. Other commentators have argued for significant scrutiny of a nominee's views, 
but typically they have done so with less specific guidance to Senators. See, e.g., Black, A 
Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 19 YALE L.J. 657, 657 (1970) 
(maintaining that a Senator should vote against confirmation if the Senator "firmly believes, 
on reasonable grounds, that the nominee's views on the large issues of the day will make it 
harmful to the country for him to sit and vote on the Court"); Lively, supra note 4, at 573 
(maintaining that a Senator should vote against confirmation if the Senator "believes a nomi-
nee's substantive views would be harmful to the nation's best interests"); Ross, The Func-
tions. Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 633, 681 (1987) (maintaining that a Senator should vote against confirmation 
of any nominee "whose fundamental judicial or political values differ from those of the 
senator"). 
17. Monaghan, The Confimwtion Process: Law or Politics?, 101 H.uv. L. REv. 1202, 
1207 (1988). Testifying in behalf of the Bork nomination several months prior to authoring 
the latter essay, Monaghan implicitly endorsed a very different conception of the Senate's 
role-a conception fairly close to McConnell's. He maintained that, in light of the nominee's 
"surpassing credentials" and the fact that "it is simply wrong to depict Judge Bork as a 
radical or to intimate that he lacks integrity," the Bork nomination "should have been met 
with acclamation." On the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States.· Hearings before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
IOOth Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 2926-27 (1987). At the start of his essay, Monaghan explains 
that after testifying in the Bork hearings: 
I became persuaded that my submission was incomplete. Additional argument was 
necessary to establish that my testimony, if accepted, imposed a constitutional duty 
on senators to vote for confirmation. To my surprise, further reflection convinces 
me that no such argument is possible. 
Monaghan, supra, at 1202. 
18. Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1207. 
19. /d. at 1207 n.21. 
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to "articulate a Senate role bounded in some meaningful way. "2° 
Second, "politicians face many issues at once," and it is dubious 
"that they are obliged to view all of them as matters of principle all 
the time. "21 
In this article, I propose an approach to Senate confirmation of 
Supreme Court nominees that conforms more closely to Tribe's ap-
proach than to McConnell's or Monaghan's but that varies greatly 
even from Tribe's. I share both Tribe's explicit assumption that the 
Senate is an "equal partner" in the appointment process and his 
implicit assumption that this equal partnership can be described, 
and should be implemented, in a systematic and principled way. I 
part ways with Tribe, however, on the form that this equal partner's 
systematic and principled approach should take. My proposed ap-
proach contemplates a far more searching inquiry into the nomi-
nee's basic fitness for the task and calls for an inquiry into the 
nominee's views that bears little resemblance to Tribe's two-part 
test.22 
Part I of the article identifies, and discusses the evaluation of, 
three factors central to a decision whether to confirm a Supreme 
Court nominee. Part II suggests how a Senator should aggregate 
his or her assessments of these factors to arrive at a final decision on 
the nomination. Together, Parts I and II provide a response to 
Monaghan's skepticism about the possibility of formulating a mean-
ingfully-bounded approach by offering a concrete proposal that 
claims to meet this description. Part III defends the proposed ap-
proach against arguments for a more limited Senate role in the ap-
pointment process. 
I emphasize at the outset what may be termed the "aspira-
tional" nature of my approach. I have tried to fashion an approach 
that conscientious Senators should be able and willing to apply, not 
one that necessarily will prove highly popular among today's Sena-
tors. Immersed in the hectic world of Washington politics, subject 
to a variety of presidential and interest-group pressures, many Sena-
20. Id at 1208 n.26. 
21. Id at 1207 n.2l. Monaghan seems to be in a rather distinct minority among com-
mentators in his conception of the Senate's role. See Ross, supra note 16, at 634 ("commenta-
tors generally agree that the Senate would abuse its constitutional prerogative if it rejected a 
nominee on grounds that were ... blatantly political"). 
22. With limited exception, see infra note 26, I do not attempt to detail below the diffi-
culties that I see with Tribe's approach. As my proposed approach should make clear, how-
ever, I do not think that his approach calls for a sufficiently rigorous examination of a 
nominee's general qualifications, and I believe that his two-part test misses the mark as far as 
the appropriate focus for an inquiry into the nominee's views. Tribe's approach is strongly 
criticized in Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nomi-
nations (Review Essay), 95 YALE L.J. 1283 (1986). Although I agree with a number of 
Friedman's criticisms, I do not, as indicated in Part III -B, subscribe to various others. 
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tors may object to this approach as too complex or onerous to apply 
or too principled in the factors that it recognizes as relevant. 
Although such a response would be understandable, it also 
would be unwarranted. At least for present purposes, I do not seri-
ously question Monaghan's claim that politicians are not obliged to 
"view all [issues] as matters of principle all the time. "2J There may 
well be various matters that Senators are justified in resolving with 
their own or their party's welfare, rather than the welfare of the 
general populace, paramount in mind. I very seriously question, 
however, Monaghan's tacit assumption that if the above claim is 
true, then it also must be true that politicians are not obliged to 
view the particular issue of confirming a Supreme Court nominee as 
a matter of principle. The inference simply does not follow. 
In contrast to Monaghan, I suggest that the implications of a 
decision to confirm a Supreme Court nominee are sufficiently great 
that, unless Senators are virtually never obliged to treat issues as 
"matters of principle," they must be obliged to accord this issue 
such treatment. First, as discussed in Part I, every decision of this 
sort significantly implicates important national interests. The same 
obviously cannot be said of a wide range of decisions that Senators 
commonly make. Second, a decision to confirm a Supreme Court 
nominee has a finality that the typical legislative decision does not. 
If legislation proves ill-advised, Senators may, with the concurrence 
of the House and the President, amend or repeal it. If a decision to 
confirm a Supreme Court nominee proves ill-advised, Senators in 
effect have no control over the length of time that it will continue to 
have deleterious effects. Article III of the Constitution essentially 
guarantees the successful nominee life tenure on the Court.24 
Ultimately, I believe that, out of either a sense of duty2s or 
sensitivity to the great publicity and public attention that a decision 
on a Supreme Court nominee receives, a sizable group of Senators is 
quite open to an approach that promises to facilitate their making 
this decision in a systematic and principled way. Perhaps few, if 
any, of these Senators would be willing to adopt my proposed ap-
proach in all of its details. At a minimum, however, I am hopeful 
that they would recognize its usefulness both in guiding their con-
23. See Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1207 n.21; supra text accompanying note 21. 
24. ". . . The Judges, both ofthe supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour .... " U.S. CoNST., art. III, § l. 
25. Cf [Senator Charles McC.) Mathias, Advice and Consent: The Role of the United 
States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 200, 207 (1987) (Senate 
decisions on nominations to the federal courts "may often be tough indeed, requiring an 
adherence to principle in the face of strong partisan pressures. For when the Senate carries 
out its function of advice and consent, its first loyalty must be not to the political parties, nor 
to the president, but to the people and to the Constitution they have established"). 
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sideration of particular factors that they regard as important and in 
helping them place in perspective and sensibly weight their assess-
ments of such factors. 
I. FACTORS CENTRAL TO THE DECISION 
I begin with a proposition that may seem modest but that is 
not uncontroversial and will be defended at length in Part III: A 
Senator's decision whether to vote for or against a Supreme Court 
nominee should reflect his or her informed judgment as to whether 
the nominee's appointment is in the nation's best interests. In gen-
eral I suggest that, to reach such an informed judgment, a Senator 
principally should consider how positive or negative an influence 
the nominee's appointment is likely to have with respect to: 
1. The outcome of cases of major national significance 
2. Public confidence in the Supreme Court 
3. The fairness and efficiency of the Supreme Court's deci-
sionmaking process.26 
These three subject matters are peculiarly relevant to an informed 
judgment on Supreme Court appointments for two reasons. First, 
any appointment to the Court reasonably may be expected to have a 
material influence with regard to each. Second, each is a matter of 
substantial national importance. The substantial national impor-
tance of the outcome of cases of major national significance follows 
essentially as a matter of definition. That the Court often decides 
such cases should not be in serious doubt.27 Public confidence in all 
our institutions of national government is vital in terms of national 
stability. Moreover, it may have special importance as regards the 
Supreme Court. Lacking the enforcement mechanisms of the Presi-
dent and Congress, the Court is especially reliant on public respect 
for its effectiveness.2s Lastly, the fairness and efficiency of the 
26. I use the formulation "inftuence with respect to" rather than "inftuence on" in an 
effort to make clear that the focus at the outset is not the appointment's ultimate impact on 
these three subject matters but rather the type of inftuence that the appointment would exert. 
Thus, for example, a Senator might find that an appointment's likely inftuence with respect to 
the first subject matter is very negative even though the nominee's vote will probably not have 
a material impact on the outcome of cases of major national significance unless and until the 
Court's membership changes significantly. As indicated in Part 11-B infra, I do make allow-
ance for impact to be considered at a later point in the decision process. I believe, however, 
that to avoid confusion and undue emphasis on short-term consequences, it needs to be con-
sidered separate from and subsequent to the considerations addressed in Part I. The part of 
Tribe's proposed two-part inquiry that addresses the Court's balance (see L. TRIBE, supra 
note 9, at 106-11; supra text accompanying notes 15 & 16) calls for the type of focus on 
impact that I regard as highly problematic and wish to avoid. 
27. For anyone who does have doubts on the matter, see L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 3-
30. 
28. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 503-04 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937); 
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Court's decisionmaking process has great importance by virtue of 
its implications for the sound and orderly development of nation-
wide law.29 
A. INFLUENCE AS TO OUTCOME OF CASES 
As an initial matter, a Senator seeking to assess the first of the 
above factors-how positive or negative an influence the nominee's 
appointment is likely to have with respect to the outcome of cases of 
major national significance-must try to predict which issues are 
likely to assume such significance during the nominee's years on the 
Court. The task is obviously a difficult one, increasingly so as the 
focus moves further away from the present. It can be performed in 
a manageable and meaningful way, however, if done with recogni-
tion of its inherent difficulties. First, Senators should think in 
rather broad terms in identifying such issues. Essentially, they 
should identify as "issues" clusters of the types of issues apt to arise 
in specific litigation-"affirmative action," "limitations on repro-
ductive freedom," "state immunity from federal regulation," and 
the like. 3o Second, Senators should limit their focus to the not too 
distant future. Ultimately, as indicated in Part 11-B, Senators must 
take account of the underlying uncertainties in deciding how much 
weight to give to an assessment of the appointment's likely influence 
as to the outcome of cases. Having simplified the task of prediction, 
they must take care to avoid placing undue weight on the prediction 
reached. 
After identifying the likely issues of future importance, a Sena-
tor must attempt to predict how the nominee, if confirmed, would 
vote on them. An obvious course of action-simply asking the 
Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 796 
(1957). Justice Powell not long ago made this point colorfully and persuasively in a televised 
interview when he discussed the Court's capacity for enforcing its judgment in the Nixon 
Tapes Case (United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). In Search of the Constitution: 
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. (Public Affairs Television, Inc., B. Moyers exec. ed. 1987). 
29. I emphasize that, in singling out these three subject matters, I do not mean to pre-
clude the possibility that, under certain circumstances, a Senator may be justified in treating 
another subject matter as more releva_'lt to his or her confirmation decision than any or all of 
these three. It is entirely conceivable that, for reasons related or unrelated to the particular 
nominee, an appointment's likely influence with regard to another subject matter may have 
greater bearing on the interests of the nation. I suggest, however, that the three listed subject 
matters are generally of sufficient relevance that a Senator should not relegate any or all of 
them to secondary status without thinking seriously about the justification for doing so. 
30. Senators reasonably could disagree as to whether a particular issue is one of major 
national significance, and in light of ideological difl"erences, some such disagreement would 
seem inevitable. I am inclined to believe, however, that the level of disagreement would be 
relatively low. In particular, although ideological difl"erences may translate into differing esti-
mates of an issue's significance, they frequently seem to allow for consensus as to an issue's 
significance while generating different perceptions as to the issue's proper resolution. 
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nominee how he or she would vote-is apt to prove distinctly un-
helpful. Since 1955, it has become customary for Supreme Court 
nominees to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee and re-
spond to questions.Jt Citing the need to avoid prejudicing or ap-
pearing to prejudice their future decisionmaking on the Court, 
however, nominees routinely have refused to answer questions that 
call upon them to indicate their likely votes on issues apt to come 
before the Court.32 To the extent that nominees have been willing 
to discuss such issues in the committee hearings, they typicallyJJ 
have limited their remarks to explaining the issues' complexity or 
importance34 or affirming broad principles that virtually no one 
31. The first Supreme Court nominee to appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
was Harlan F. Stone in 1925. The committee permitted him to appear to respond to charges 
that he had acted improperly as Attorney General with regard to the indictment of a United 
States Senator. The next nominee to appear was Felix Frankfurter in 1939. Frankfurter 
appeared at the committee's invitation-an invitation apparently prompted by allegations 
that the nominee had ties to the Communist Party. Ten years later Sherman Minton aroused 
substantial opposition by declining an invitation to appear, and every nominee since John 
Marshall Harlan in 1955 has appeared. See Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Histori-
cal Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1157-63 (1988); Ross, The Questioning of Supreme 
Court Nominees at Senate Confirmation Hearings: Proposals for Accommodating the Needs of 
the Senate and Ameliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62 TuL L. REv. 109, 116-23 (1987). 
32. See, e.g., On the Nomination of Sondra Day O'Connor of Arizona to Serw! as an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1981): 
Judge O'CONNOR. ... I do not believe that as a nominee I can tell you how I 
might vote on a particular issue which may come before the Court, or endorse or 
criticize specific Supreme Court decisions presenting issues which may well come 
before the Court again. To do so would mean that I have prejudged the matter or 
have morally committed myself to a certain position. Such a statement by me as to 
how I might resolve a particular issue or what I might do in a future Court action 
might make it necessary for me to disqualify myself on the matter. This would 
result in my inability to do my sworn duty; namely, to decide cases that come before 
the Court. 
33. A notable exception was Robert Bork. He was far more willing than most 
nominees to discuss issues of this sort. See Ross, supra note 31, at 109-12, 139-40. His past 
statements were so unusually revealing of his likely votes on the Court, see infra text accom-
panying notes 36-39, and the votes thus indicated seemed so certain to meet with the disap-
proval of a majority of the Senate, that he probably felt that he had little choice in the matter. 
Unless he could persuade a number of Senators that he was more openminded on various 
important issues than his past statements might make it appear, his confirmation seemed 
doomed. For a range of views on the propriety and proper scope of Senate questioning of 
Supreme Court nominees, see Freund, supra note 31, at 1162-63; McKay, Selection of United 
States Supreme Court Justices, 9 U. KAN. L. REv. 109, 131-33 (1960); Mikva, Judge Picking, 
10 D1sr. LAw., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 36; Ross, supra; Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and 
the Public: To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1213 (1988). 
34. See, e.g., On the Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia to Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1986): 
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would dispute.Js 
In some instances, Senators have been able to gain substantial 
insight into a nominee's likely votes on important issues by examin-
ing statements that the nominee has made in the past as to how 
such issues should be resolved. One such instance was the Bork 
nomination. In articles, speeches, and the like, the nominee over 
the years had staked out positions contrary to the Court's on a wide 
array of constitutional issues.36 Of course, it could be argued-and 
Senator SIMON .... [A]re basic traditions pretty sound in the whole church-
state area? 
Judge SCALIA. I'm not sure what you mean by "basic traditions," Senator. 
Senator SIMON. Interpretation of the constitutional principles in this area as 
they have emerged over the past two centuries. 
Judge SCALIA. Well, I think what's sound is that-what's accepted-the 
problem in the area, Senator, is a problem that largely arises because of a natural 
conflict between the establishment clause and the freedom-of-religion clause. Both 
of those interests are very important. People ought to be able to practice their reli-
gion freely, and yet the Government cannot establish religion. 
So you get cases like the case of the Jehovah's Witness, who, being a sabbata-
rian, wants to have Saturday off instead of Sunday, and wants to draw unemploy-
ment compensation when she's been offered a job that requires work on Saturday 
and turned it down. 
And the way the Court resolved the case was to say it violated the freedom-of-
religion clause for a State not to allow her to draw unemployment compensation 
simply because she refused to accept a job that would require her to work on Satur-
day. 
Well, yes, that does protect freedom of religion, but, on the other hand, doesn't 
that somehow amount to an establishment of religion to have the State make a 
special rule to accommodate the religious belief of this sabbatarian? 
That's the problem that runs throughout these cases .... 
35. See, e.g., On the Nominations of William H. Rehnquist, of Arizona. and Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., of Virginia, to Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 65 (1971): 
Senator BA YH. . . . Can the Government go out here on a fishing expedition 
and promiscuously bug telephones because the President, himself, seems to feel it 
meets a certain criterion; or should it meet the probable cause test that is not foreign 
to our system of jurisprudence? 
Mr. REHNQUIST. I think the answer to the first part of your question is so 
clear that I should have no hesitancy in giving it, that, certainly, the Government 
cannot simply go out on a fishing expedition, promiscuously bugging people's 
phones. As to whether a standard of probable cause, in the sense of probable cause 
to arrest, in the sense of probable cause laid down by the Omnibus Crime Act of 
1968, or probable cause to obtain a search warrant for tangible evidence, it seems to 
me those are the sort of questions that may well be before the Court, and I ought 
not to respond. 
36. See, e.g., The Human Life BilL· Hearings on S.l58 Before the Subcomm. on Separa-
tion of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., lst Sess. 308-16 (1981) 
(statement of Robert Bork); Bork, The Impassibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Consti-
tution, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 695; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). See generally On the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on 
the Judiciary, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess .• pt. 5, at 6180-6285 (1987) (Senate Judiciary Committee 
report on the nomination); Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 101 (1987); 
Gillers, The Compelling Case Against Robert H. Bork, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 33 (1987). 
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essentially was by the nomineeJ'-that Robert Bork the academic 
free to wield a sharp pen (or tongue) from the sidelines must be seen 
as very different from Robert Bork one of nine Justices entrusted 
with presiding over the orderly growth of the law. It required con-
siderable effort, however, not to find in Robert Bork's past state-
ments strong guidance as to his likely votes on the Court. Senators 
both for and against the nomination clearly found such guidance,3s 
and there seems little question that the person who nominated him 
did as well. 39 
As others have noted,40 however, Robert Bork was far from 
the usual nominee in terms ofthe type of"paper trai1"4t that he had 
left for Senators seeking to predict his likely votes. Much more typ-
ical is the nominee who comes before the Senate having written or 
publicly said little or nothing directly addressing how the Court 
should be resolving the major issues of the day.42 In light of two 
basic realities, the most logical way of predicting likely votes on 
37. See, e.g., On the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
lOOth Cong., lst Sess., pt. l, at 129, 666-67, 855 (1987). 
38. See Taylor, Bork Fight· Tactics Supplant Issues, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1987, at A23, 
col. l. 
39. See Oakes, Why the Smears by Bark's Allies?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at A35, 
col. 3. 
40. See, e.g., Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1164, 1167-
70 (1988); Ross, supra note 31, at 110 & n.3. 
41. I borrow the phrase from Senator Kennedy. See Brinkley, President Selects Appel-
late Judge to Become Justice, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1987, at AI, col. 6, 023, col. 4 (quoting 
Senator Kennedy's characterization of nominee Douglas Ginsburg-President Reagan's 
choice after the Bork nomination had failed-as "an ideological clone of Judge Bork-a 
Judge Bork without a paper trail"). 
42. To be sure, nominees with prior judicial experience may have had occasion on the 
bench to resolve many issues of the sort that they may be expected to encounter on the Court, 
and their opinions may well shed some light on their likely votes on the Court. These opin-
ions, however, almost cannot help but shed considerably less light on likely votes than schol-
arship like Robert Bork's, because they are written under the onus of treating as definitive the 
precedents of the Supreme Court. However much the opinion-writer may disagree with any 
of the Court's precedents, he or she is obliged to accept them as the law of the land. Thus, for 
example, although at the time of his Supreme Court nomination Justice Kennedy had served 
as a federal appellate judge for about a dozen years, there was far less agreement as to his 
likely votes than Judge Bork's. See Greenhouse, Senate Panel Approves Judge Kennedy, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 28, 1988, at AlO, col. l. 
Probably the only opinion-writing that in general even approximates scholarship like 
Robert Bork's in its utility for predicting likely votes are some opinions by members of state 
high courts. In interpreting state constitutional or statutory provisions that duplicate or 
closely resemble federal ones, a state supreme court judge similarly offers relatively direct 
insight into his or her likely votes on the Court. Not only are the issues addressed very much 
like the ones that the nominee may be expected to see on the Court; but also the judge in 
resolving such issues enjoys a degree of interpretive freedom very much like that enjoyed by 
members of the Court. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977); Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitu-
tional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985). 
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these occasions is to examine the nominee's past statements and ac-
tivities for indications of his or her ideological leanings and concep-
tion of the judicial role and then, based on these indications, to 
draw inferences about likely votes. The two realities are, first, that 
virtually any issue of importance apt to come before the Court will 
lend itself to reasonable differences of opinion as to its proper reso-
lution, 43 and second, that the way in which the nominee, if con-
firmed, will vote on such an issue will be significantly shaped by his 
or her political and social philosophy and attitudes about the role of 
courts.44 
In drawing inferences about likely votes, a Senator must be 
careful not to assume too readily that a nominee's apparent ideolog-
ical tenets will translate directly into votes: A nominee's attitudes 
about the judicial role frequently may lead the nominee to vote dif-
ferently on the Court than he or she would vote if placed in a purely 
policymaking position. 4s Even if a Senator is careful in this regard, 
however, the prediction of likely votes often cannot help but be 
quite uncertain. Most obviously, a nominee's ideology and concep-
tion of the judicial role may resist relatively precise identification. 
Furthermore, even if they are fairly clearly ascertainable, it may be 
rather unclear how they translate into votes, particularly if the 
nominee is quite openminded, generally willing and able to take se-
riously points of view in conflict with his or her own. 46 Perhaps 
most important, the ideological tenets and attitudes about the role 
of courts of any nominee--and, again, particularly more open-
minded ones-are subject to change. Elevation to the nation's most 
visible and powerful court, interaction with other Justices,47 public 
criticism of the individual Justice or of the Court's performance in 
general, 48 personal experiences not arising out of the Justice's work 
on the Court49-these and other factors may cause a Justice's ideol-
43. See Schauer, Judging in a Comer of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1717, 1725-29 
( 1988); cf Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection 
Clause, 29 STAN. L. REv. 663, 682-709 (1977) (discussing modem equal protection prece-
dent). AJ; Justice O'Connor has remarked, the ,Court's business essentially consists of issues 
as to which one can ''write persuasively on either side." In Search of the Constitution: Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor (Public Affairs Television, Inc., B. Moyers exec. ed. 1987). 
44. See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE CoURT 161-66 (1960); Schauer, supra note 
43, at 1729-31. 
45. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 219-22 (discussing Justice Frankfurter). 
46. See, e.g., Gunther, untitled essay in A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 
HARV. L. REv. 395, 409-14 (1987) (discussing Justice Powell). 
47. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 260 (discussing influence of Justice Frank-
furter on Justice Harlan). 
48. See, e.g., id. at 304 (suggesting possible influence on Justice Blackmun of criticism 
of his opinion for the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
49. See, e.g., Powe, Justice Douglas After Fifty Year:s: The Fir:st Amendment, McConhy-
ism and Rights, 6 CoNST. COMM. 267, 268-69 (1989) (attributing Justice Douglas's "leftward 
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ogy and judicial philosophy to evolve significantly from the form 
that they took at the time of nomination. 
Without denying the importance of these sources of uncer-
tainty, I emphasize that predicting likely votes is hardly so uncer-
tain as to justify not making the prediction, thereby eliminating 
from the confirmation decision the highly relevant factor of likely 
influence as to the outcome of cases. Rather, as indicated in Part 
11-B, the proper response to this uncertainty is to discount for it 
when deciding how much weight to assign to the assessment of this 
factor.so 
evolution" on free speech questions to "the passing from the scene of his patron FOR," "his 
summer travels in the third world," "experience simpliciter which by the mid-19SOs caused 
him to believe that restrictions on speech were invariably motivated by fear, or worse," and 
"the waning of Douglas's presidential ambitions"). 
SO. An interesting and relevant question that I do not attempt to address in this article 
is: What does history tell us about the degree of certainty with which a prediction appropri-
ately may be made as to a nominee's likely votes? By comparing the Justices' actual votes 
with the votes that, based on information available upon reasonably diligent inquiry at the 
time of nomination, one would have predicted they would cast, one could achieve insights 
that would prove useful in applying the approach proposed in this article. 
A number of commentators have attempted to generalize about a distinct but related 
matter: the extent to which the Justices have belied expectations that the Presidents who 
nominated them held at the time of their nomination. Their estimates have varied signifi-
cantly. See, e.g., R. SciGLIANO, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 147 (1971) 
("about one justice in four whose performance could be evaluated did not conform to the 
expectations of his appointer in important matters that came before the Supreme Court"); L. 
TRIBE, supra note 9, at SO ("Presidents who have tried to leave their mark on the Court by 
selecting Justices with care have only rarely found the meal unpalatable. For the most part, 
and especially in areas of particular and known concern to a President, Justices have been 
loyal to the ideals and perspectives ofthe men who have nominated them"); Friedman, supra 
note 22, at 1292 ("Most Justices fit at least very roughly the expectations that Presidents and 
Senators have at the time of nomination. But ... there have been a substantial number of 
surprises"); Lively, supra note 4, at 564 (''The record of past appointments indicates that a 
president who endeavors to appoint someone whose performance will be sympathetic to ad-
ministration policies likely will succeed. Given an enhanced combination of executive atten-
tion, preparation, and experience, nomination of a person whose performance proved 
unpredictable would seem an especially remote possibility"); Rehnquist, Presidential Appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court, 2 CoNST. CoMM. 319, 320-21 (1985) ("I think history teaches us 
that those [Presidents] who have tried (to 'pack' the Court] have been at least partially suc-
cessful, but that a number of factors militate against a President having anything more than 
partial success") (reprinting a 1984 speech by then-Justice Rehnquist). For present purposes, 
I see no need to enter this debate. None of these accounts casts serious doubt on the viability 
of the inquiry that I propose into an appointment's likely inftuence as to the outcome of cases. 
Cf Rehnquist, supra, at 319-21 (despite suggesting that a President reasonably can aspire to 
only rather limited success in trying to "pack" the Court with Justices who will vote consist-
ently with Administration policies, maintaining that there is "no reason in the world" why a 
President should not try to pack the Court). 
Parenthetically, I note that I question whether any attempt to generalize about the ex-
tent to which the Justices have belied presidential expectations can realistically hope to be 
highly persuasive. Most obviously, the entire enterprise is plagued by the enormous difficulty 
of establishing the specific nature of a President's expectations as to a particular nominee. 
The task is not easy even if one assumes that, in selecting nominees, Presidents have been 
motivated only by a desire to secure people who will vote their way on important issues. 
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Finally, to be comprehensive in assessing this factor, a Senator 
should consider whether the nominee is apt to prove particularly 
able to sway others on the Court to his or her views. The greater a 
Justice's ability in this regard, the greater his or her influence as to 
the outcome of cases. Typically, Senators will be unable to predict 
with any degree of confidence whether the nominee will be unusu-
ally able to attract other Justices' votes. At times, however, this 
prediction may not seem so undirected-for example, if the nomi-
nee is being put forward for Chief Justice,st or if the nominee has 
demonstrated in past positions an ability to exercise intellectual 
leadership that seems extraordinary even for a nominee to the 
Supreme Court.s2 On these occasions, a Senator should be prepared 
to make this prediction part of the assessment of likely influence as 
to the outcome of cases. 
B. INFLUENCE AS TO PUBLIC CoNFIDENCE IN CoURT 
Public confidence in the Court depends upon a variety of per-
ceptions on the part of the public. Ideally, in trying to decide how 
positive or negative an influence a nominee's appointment is likely 
to have with regard to public confidence in the Court, a Senator 
would assess separately the appointment's likely influence as to each 
of these perceptions, and then arrive at an overall assessment on the 
basis of these more specific ones. To keep the inquiry manageable, 
however, a Senator probably should limit it to the several percep-
tions that seem most determinative of public confidence in the 
Court: How distinguished are the Justices in terms of intellectual 
credentials and prior professional experience? How great is their 
personal integrity? How objective, openminded, and candid are 
they in their decisionmaking? How representative are they of differ-
ent groups in society? 
In considering an appointment's likely influence as to the pub-
What issues were in the President's contemplation at the time of nomination? What resolu-
tions were then preferred? Were there not at least some issues as to which the President did 
not expect the nominee to vote to the Administration's liking? Moreover, the task takes on 
significantly greater complexity once one factors in the reality that in making Supreme Court 
nominations, Presidents have been motivated not by a single consideration but by a wide 
array of them. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 49-70 (providing an overview as to "why 
they get there"). 
51. See L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 37 (Chief Justices "present the most obvious exam-
ples of the 'one Justice who can make a di1ference.' Although often in dissent, and sometimes 
lagging behind instead of leading the Court, one Chief can make all the di1ference in the 
constitutional world"). 
52. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 31, at 1151-52 (discussing Justice Brandeis). See also 
Ackerman, supra note 40, at 1168 ("In contrast to the normal nominee, here [in the case of 
Robert Bork] was a man whose public record suggested that he might possess both the trans-
formative vision and legal ability needed to spearhead a radical judicial break with the past"). 
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lie perception of the Justice's intellectual and professional distinc-
tion, a Senator should examine the nominee's various tangible 
achievements apt to affect this perception. Among the most rele-
vant would be schools attended, degrees received, employment his-
tory, public service, and publications.s3 
A Senator seeking to gauge an appointment's likely influence 
as to the public perception of the Justices personal integrity needs to 
consider broadly the nominee's ethics in his or her professional and 
nonprofessional dealings. The Senator should be attentive to such 
matters as the nominee's sensitivity in the past to financial conflicts 
of interest,s4 history of compliance with generally applicable legal 
constraints and relevant professional codes of conduct,ss and in-
volvement with clubs or organizations with exclusive membership 
criteria.s6 
In assessing an appointment's likely influence as to the public 
perception of the Justice's objectivity, openmindedness, and candor 
in decisionmaking, a Senator rather obviously needs to look for in-
dications of the nominee's capacity for objective, openminded, and 
candid decisionmaking. Where the nominee has substantial judicial 
experience, his or her performance on the bench may be expected to 
offer direct and significant insight into this capacity. Where the 
nominee lacks such experience, a Senator's insight into this capacity 
almost invariably will be less direct but need not be less signifi-
cant.s7 If the various governmental and private actors investigating 
and reporting on nominees are conscientious about their work,ss a 
53. Presidents generally have refrained from nominating obvious mediocrities. A nomi-
nation widely regarded at the time as an exception in this regard was President Nixon's 
nomination of G. Harrold Carswell. See supra note 4. 
54. Senate concern with this matter figured prominently, for example, in the defeat of 
the Haynsworth nomination in 1969. For discussion of the incidents in question and a be-
lated defense of the nominee, see McConnell, supra note 5, at 14-20. 
55. To accomplish its purpose, any inquiry into this matter almost certainly cannot be 
limited to adjudicated noncompliance with these norms. Cf. Totenberg, supra note 33, at 
1225 (discussing press inquiry into nominee Douglas Ginsburg's marijuana use). 
56. Among the items in nominee G. Harrold Carswell's past that caused considerable 
Senate consternation was his role in helping a municipal whites-only golf club become private 
so as to avoid the impact of Supreme Court decisions invalidating segregated public facilities. 
SeeR. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 18-19, 41-44. 
57. In general, Senators may well tend to have Jess confidence in their assessment of a 
nominee's capacity for objective, openminded, and candid decisionmaking where the nominee 
lacks substantial judicial experience. This is not particularly problematic, however, because, 
as discussed in Part 11-B, they would take their confidence in the specific assessment into 
account in deciding how much weight to give to their overall assessment of the appointment's 
likely inftuence as to public confidence in the Court. 
58. The principal actors in this regard are: the FBI, see J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND 
CoNSENT OF THE SENATE 239-40, 244 (1953); the American Bar Association's Standing 
Committee on Federal Judiciary, see H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 32-39; the press, see 
Totenberg, supra note 33; and the Senate Judiciary Committee, see Ross, supra note 16. 
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Senator should have access to information about past statements 
and activities quite revealing of the nominee's general objectivity, 
openmindedness, and candor. In addition, in interpreting available 
information, a Senator appropriately may employ certain rules of 
thumb. One such rule might be that a nominee who has long served 
in a partisan role is apt to have limited capacity for objective 
decisionmaking.s9 
In evaluating an appointment's likely influence as to the public 
perception of the Justices representativeness of different groups in 
society, a Senator should consider whether the nominee is a mem-
ber of any group whose lack of representation or proportional un-
derrepresentation on the Court casts substantial doubt in the eyes of 
the public on the Court's fairness and impartiality. In doing so, the 
Senator should take into account any view that such inadequate 
representation exists that is shared by a substantial proportion of 
the nation's people. He or she should assume, however, that the 
larger the proportion of people sharing the view, the greater the 
appointment's likely influence as to the public perception of the Jus-
tices' representativeness. 
On some occasions, the public opinion relevant to gauging an 
appointment's likely influence as to the public perception of the Jus-
tices' representativeness may be so apparent as to require no serious 
investigation. The nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor in 1981 to 
be the first woman ever to sit on the Court was one such occasion.60 
When the relevant public opinion lacks such clarity, however, Sena-
tors should not be reluctant to make use of public opinion polls. 
Such polls are more than sufficiently sophisticated to ascertain this 
opinion with reasonable precision.6t Moreover, the questions are of 
the sort that in most instances Senators probably would need to do 
no more than locate the results of polls already commissioned. 
C. INFLUENCE AS TO COURT'S DECISIONMAKING PROCESS 
Like public confidence in the Court, the fairness and efficiency 
of the Court's decisionmaking process depends upon a number of 
variables. Also like public confidence in the Court, it is probably 
best considered for purposes of a confirmation decision in terms of 
only several such variables. Three seem particularly relevant: the 
59. This rule of thumb runs counter to the Senate's longstanding practice (discussed in 
H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 46-48) of giving relaxed scrutiny to nominees to the Court 
from the Senate's own ranks. Whether or not this rule is used, the approach proposed in this 
article rather clearly leaves no room for such special treatment of members of the "club.". 
60. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 330-33; In Search of the Constitution: Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor, supra note 43. 
61. See generally N. BRADBURN & S. SUDMAN, POLLS AND SURVEYS (1988). 
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quality and fullness of deliberation and debate; the individual Jus-
tices' capacities for personal productivity; and the nature of interac-
tions among the Justices. 
In considering how positive or negative an influence a nomi-
nee's appointment is likely to have with regard to the first of these 
variables, a Senator should focus on an array of personal character-
istics. Among the most important are some already discussed with 
regard to public confidence in the Court: objectivity, openminded-
ness, candor, and membership in a group unrepresented or under-
represented on the Court. 62 Other pertinent characteristics include 
ones as diverse as the nominee's general analytical abilities, ability 
to empathize with persons whose background or circumstances dif-
fer significantly from his or her own,6J and conversance with issues 
of public law.64 
62. The fact that these characteristics are relevant to assessing two factors does not 
indicate that the factors are not sufficiently discrete to warrant separate consideration. 
Rather, it simply underlines the importance of these characteristics to the overall decision. 
Objectivity and openmindedness are probably singled out more than any other characteristics 
as essential for a Justice of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 9, at 103 
("Perhaps the most important qualification for being a Supreme Court Justice is the posses-
sion of an open mind"); Frankfurter, supra note 28, at 793 (the work of the Court "demands 
the habit of curbing any tendency to reach results agreeable to desire or to embrace the 
solution of a problem before exhausting its comprehensive analysis. One in whose keeping 
may be the decision of the Court must have a disposition to be detached and withdrawn"). 
Also striking is the frequency with which these characteristics are invoked on occasions hon-
oring a recently retired or deceased Justice-occasions on which the speaker or writer can be 
expected to identify qualities that in his or her view are basic attributes of an outstanding 
Justice. See, e.g., In Memoriam: Honorable Hugo Lafayette Black. Proceedings of the Bar 
and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States, 92 S. Ct. app. 64 (Apr. 18, 1972) 
(remarks of George Saunders) ("As much or more than any Justice in the history of this 
Court, he sought to keep his own personal views out of his decisions"); In Memoriam: Hon-
orable John Marshall Harlan. Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, 92A S. Ct. app. 19 (Oct. 24, 1972) (remarks of David Shapiro) ("Most impres-
sive to a law clerk was the Justice's willingness to reopen any issue and his continuing con-
cern about disagreement within the world of his own chambers. . . . These qualities were 
reflected in the care and candor with which he sometimes publicly changed positions on 
decided issues, and in the avowedly tentative nature of his exploration of new constitutional 
territory"); Gunther, supra note 46, at 410 ("[Justice Powell] displayed a genuine capacity to 
listen to and learn from both sides of an argument; he approached the cases before him with 
remarkable openmindedness. . . . [A] judge who practices detachment and seeks to preserve 
the integrity of the law rather than seeing it as merely a tool is rare and admirable indeed"). 
63. On the general importance to adjudication of being able to take other persons' per-
spectives, see Minow, The Supreme Court, /986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 
HARV. L. REv. 10 (1987). On its importance in a specific context, see Simson, The Establish-
ment Clause in the Supreme Court.· Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 
905, 915-16 (1987). 
64. The importance of prior judicial experience has been a source of controversy over 
the years. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 52-61. Of the 104 persons who have sat on the 
Court, only 23 have had ten or more years of prior judicial experience and 42, including 9 of 
the 16 Chief Justices and such luminaries as Story, Brandeis, and Frankfurter, have had none 
at all. See id. at 52. For a vigorous rebuttal of the importance of such experience for service 
on the Court, see Frankfurter, supra note 28. 
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A Senator also needs to be sensitive to various personal quali-
ties in assessing the nominee's capacity for personal productivity. 
Most obviously, are efficiency, organization, and diligence traits 
generally associated with the nominee? What is the nominee's ca-
pacity for decisiveness? Is the nominee's health materially in 
question?6s 
Finally, an evaluation of likely influence as to the nature of 
interactions among the Justices calls for broad inquiry into the 
nominee's collegial abilities. For example, is the nominee someone 
who tends to move colleagues toward, rather than away from, con-
sensus? Is he or she, to borrow a phrase used to eulogize Justice 
Harlan, "able to disagree without being disagreeable"?66 
Even with access to investigatory reports on the nominee, Sen-
ators ultimately may be unable to resolve with assurance various 
questions relevant to assessing the appointment's likely influence as 
to the Court's decisionmaking process. The fact that some ques-
tions may resist relatively clear resolution, however, does not mean 
that Senators cannot render a meaningful assessment of this factor. 
It simply means that they should be careful to take their uncertainty 
about the assessment into account when they decide how much 
weight to give to each factor. 
II. AGGREGATING THE FACTORS 
I suggest that a Senator's ultimate decision on a Supreme 
Court nominee should depend upon whether he or she concludes 
that the President, acting with the nation's best interests in mind, 
reasonably can be expected to nominate someone whose appoint-
ment would be likely to have, on the whole, a materially more posi-
tive influence with regard to the three factors discussed above. 67 If, 
in the Senator's view, the President reasonably can be expected to 
make such a nomination, the Senator should vote to reject the cur-
65. As one commentator has noted: "Presidents generally nominate pen;ons whose 
health is robust because they hope that their nominees will have long tenures. Health there-
fore is not usually an issue and has never been a serious issue." Ross, supra note 16, at 648. 
Another commentator has recently criticized the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, for 
not treating then-Justice Rehnquist's health as a potentially serious issue in the 1986 hearings 
on his nomination to be Chief Justice. Totenberg, supra note 33, at 1218 (discussing need to 
question nominee about apparently serious health problem in 1981). 
66. Warren, Mr. Justice Harlan, As Seen by a Colleague, 85 HARV. L. REv. 369, 370 
(1971). 
67. A Senator's focus obviously needs to be somewhat different on occasions when the 
President making the nomination is nearing the completion of his or her term. If the current 
President may not be the one to make another nomination if the present one fails, Senators 
need to broaden their focus to include the nominees whom the pen;ons most likely to succeed 
the President reasonably could be expected to name. 
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rent nominee. Under the circumstances, the probable gain in terms 
of the three factors from defeating the nomination seems sufficiently 
substantial to outweigh the costs of doing so-most notably, the 
adverse effects on the Court of operating with a seat unfilled,6s the 
further expenditures of time and effort required of the Senate and 
the President, and the risk that the person subsequently nominated 
will be less desirable. If, in the Senator's view, the President reason-
ably cannot be expected to make a nomination of the sort described 
above, the Senator should vote in favor of the current nominee. 
Here, the lesser probable gain from defeating the nomination seems 
too insubstantial to outweigh the costs, which are greater as a result 
of an enhanced risk of a less desirable alternative nominee. 
I underline that the above formulation of a Senator's decision 
does not focus on whom the President, left to his or her own de-
vices, reasonably can be expected to nominate. Rather, it focuses 
on whom the President acting with the nation's best interests in mind 
reasonably can be expected to nominate. As a logical matter, Sena-
tors who are themselves seeking to decide on the nomination in ac-
cordance with the nation's best interests must adopt this latter 
focus. They should be unwilling to yield at all to presidential pref-
erences unless such preferences reflect the President's considered 
judgment as to how the nation's interests are best served. It may be 
objected that Senators adopting this posture are being not only prin-
cipled but also unrealistic. The President may in fact have para-
mount in mind personal or partisan advantage, not the nation's best 
interests. These Senators, however, are not tacitly assuming the 
contrary. Rather, they in effect are simply refusing to recognize 
these other objectives in the hope that enough Senators will do like-
wise to force the President to revise his or her priorities. 
A. PLACING THE AssESSMENTS IN PERSPECTIVE 
If a Senator's ultimate decision on a nomination is framed in 
the manner suggested above, his or her assessments of the three fac-
tors discussed in Part I are not useful until they are placed in per-
spective. More specifically, the Senator needs to consider the extent 
to which, from his or her viewpoint, each assessment is as positive 
as reasonably could be expected for someone whom the President 
would nominate with the nation's best interests in mind. 
In considering this question for the first factor, a Senator 
should acknowledge that an assessment of how positive or negative 
an influence a nominee's appointment is likely to have as to the 
68. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19. 
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outcome of cases of major national significance depends greatly 
upon the assessor's political and social philosophy. If, for example, 
a Senator and the President are highly incompatible ideologically, 
one is almost certain to view as quite negative an influence in this 
regard that the other sees as quite positive. In light of this reality, a 
Senator, in trying to gauge how positive an assessment reasonably 
could be expected for someone whom the President would nominate 
with the nation's best interests in mind, should be strongly guided 
by the President's ideology. To secure enough votes to win confir-
mation of the nominee, the President may well need to select a nom-
inee whose appointment would be likely to have an influence as to 
the outcome of cases not as positive, from the President's viewpoint, 
as the President would like. In accommodating him- or herself to 
some Senators' different perceptions of an appointment's influence 
in this regard, however, a President generally can be expected to 
remain fairly close to his or her ideological base.69 A contrary ex-
pectation would only seem reasonable in the unusual circumstance 
where the President is ideologically rather isolated from a majority 
of the Senate. 
Senators must also be sensitive to the significance of ideology in 
considering the extent to which their assessments of the second and 
third factors-an appointment's likely influence with regard to pub-
lic confidence in the Court and with regard to the fairness and effi-
ciency of the Court's decisionmaking process-are as positive as 
reasonably could be expected for someone whom the President 
would nominate with the nation's best interests in mind. In general, 
however, they should make substantially less allowance with these 
factors than with the first for differences in assessment arising out of 
ideological differences. For two reasons, the effect of ideology on 
assessments of these factors should be substantially less. First, a 
number of the matters relevant to assessing these factors do not sig-
nificantly invite ideologically-based differences in perception. Con-
sider, for example, the nominee's candor and collegial abilities. If 
Senators and the President make a reasonable attempt to be objec-
tive, their perceptions of these matters, though not entirely value-
free, should not vary materially as a result of ideological differences. 
Second, even those matters that significantly invite ideologically-
based differences in perception do not implicate ideology as fully as 
it is implicated in assessments of the first factor. Thus, for example, 
69. Cf Udall, A Master Stroke, Wash. Post, July 13, 1981, at Al3, col. 2 ("My Demo-
cratic friends ought to be grateful [about the O'Connor nomination]. . . . It's almost incon-
ceivable to me that they could do any better. Ronald Reagan isn't going to appoint liberal 
Democrats"). 
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although the degree of openmindedness that a Senator or President 
perceives in a nominee is rather obviously affected by the Senator's 
or President's ideology, ideology should hardly be determinative of 
the issue. Openmindedness has an objective component that mean-
ingfully limits the range of reasonable differences in perception. In 
an effort to simplify and keep manageable a Senator's overall deci-
sion, I suggest that unless a Senator is ideologically quite different 
from the President, he or she should make only minor allowance 
with the second and third factors for differences in assessment aris-
ing out of ideological differences. 
A Senator obviously cannot determine very precisely the differ-
ence between his or her assessment of a factor for the nominee and 
the most positive assessment that reasonably could be expected for 
someone whom the President would nominate with the nation's best 
interests in mind. As a step toward a final decision, however, it 
seems both feasible and useful for a Senator to try to characterize 
any such difference or "deficiency" as immaterial, material, or ex-
treme. I propose the following as a rough guide to intuition in 
working with these obviously inexact characterizations: A defi-
ciency with regard to a particular factor is immaterial or material 
depending upon whether it is sufficiently great as to suggest that in 
selecting the nominee the President did not carefully consider the 
nation's best interests with regard to the factor and the nominee's 
acceptability to the Senate in that regard. A deficiency with regard 
to a particular factor is material or extreme depending upon 
whether it is so great as to suggest that in selecting the nominee the 
President virtually ignored the nation's best interests with regard to 
the factor and the nominee's acceptability to the Senate in that 
regard. 
B. WEIGHTING THE FACTORS 
Under the proposed formulation of a Senator's ultimate deci-
sion on confirmation, a Senator should vote to reject any nominee 
who, in his or her view, is materially deficient on the whole and vote 
to confirm any nominee who is not. Having characterized any defi-
ciencies that may exist, a Senator therefore still must decide 
whether they indicate material deficiency overall. 
The appropriate conclusion to draw seems clear in two types of 
situations. If a Senator finds that the nominee is not materially defi-
cient as to any factor, the Senator should conclude that the nominee 
is not materially deficient overall and, on that basis, vote to confirm. 
If, on the other hand, a Senator finds that the nominee is not less 
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than materially deficient as to each factor, the Senator should reach 
the contrary conclusion and, on that basis, vote to reject. 
In situations where the appropriate conclusion is not so appar-
ent, I suggest that a Senator should attempt to determine roughly 
how much weight each factor deserves in the final decision. Based 
on these determinations, the Senator may then undertake the neces-
sarily somewhat impressionistic task of ascertaining whether the de-
ficiency or deficiencies that exist make the nominee materially 
deficient on the whole. 
Two considerations seem particularly relevant to determining 
the weight to be accorded each factor: the relative importance of 
the three factors; and the relative degree of confidence that the Sen-
ator has in his or her assessments of the three factors. The latter 
consideration will depend upon various sources of uncertainty. I 
attempted in Part I to call attention to those that seem most 
significant. 10 
With regard to the former consideration, I suggest that a Sena-
tor most reasonably would proceed as follows. First, as a tentative 
measure of relative importance, the Senator should establish in ap-
proximate terms the relative importance that he or she generally 
attaches to the subject matters to which the three factors refer-i.e., 
the outcome of cases of major national significance, public confi-
dence in the Court, and the fairness and efficiency of the Court's 
decisionmaking process. Since, by hypothesis, the Senator is seek-
ing to arrive at the decision on confirmation that best serves the 
nation's welfare, he or she should use relative importance to the 
national welfare as the criterion for estimating relative general 
importance. 
Second, the Senator should ascertain whether special circum-
stances exist that, for the short term, make any of the factors mate-
rially more or less important than usual. A Senator who believes 
that such circumstances exist with respect to a particular factor 
should adjust upward or downward his or her tentative estimate of 
the factor's importance. Assume, for example, that a retirement 
leaves the Court very closely divided on many issues of major na-
tional significance. Under the circumstances, the person appointed 
to fill the vacancy almost certainly will have a highly significant 
impact for the foreseeable future on the outcome of important 
cases.11 Senators, whatever their ideological bent, sensibly would 
70. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 46-49 and text following note 66. 
71. As proponents and opponents of the Bork nomination were well aware, Justice 
Powell's retirement was a case in point. See Taylor, Court's Vacancy Clouds Term That 
Opens Today, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1987, at AI, col. I. 
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regard these as special circumstances making the factor of the ap-
pointment's likely influence as to the outcome of cases more impor-
tant than usual. Assume instead that a retirement leaves the Court 
with a sizable majority apt to vote on almost all issues of major 
national significance in the way that a Senator would prefer. No 
matter who is appointed, the Court in the foreseeable future is very 
likely in important cases to reach results congenial to this Senator. 
The Senator justifiably would view these as special circumstances 
making the appointment's likely influence as to the outcome of 
cases less important than usual. Special circumstances are also 
readily hypothesized for the two other factors. n 
I underline that in adjusting upward or downward his or her 
tentative estimate of a factor's importance, a Senator should be 
mindful of the extent to which the special circumstances prompting 
the revision may not persist beyond the relatively near future. 
Highly foreseeable short-term effects of confirming the nominee de-
serve to be taken into account. In taking them into account, how-
ever, a Senator will rarely, if ever, be justified in departing 
dramatically from his or her tentative estimate of a factor's impor-
tance. To do so would almost certainly unfairly denigrate the im-
portance of the long-term consequences of confirming the nominee. 
C. REsOLVING THE HARD CASES 
If Senators sensibly could weight the three factors with any-
thing approaching mathematical precision, the ultimate decision 
whether the nominee is materially deficient overall would be greatly 
facilitated. Quite obviously, however, they cannot, and the ultimate 
decision is inevitably approximate and complex. Is a nominee ma-
terially deficient overall who is materially deficient as to only one 
factor but that factor is entitled to substantially more weight than 
either of the other two? What about a nominee who is materially 
deficient as to two factors and all three factors are entitled to 
roughly the same weight? Or a nominee who is extremely deficient 
72. Assume, for example, that based on public opinion polls and other barometers of 
public sentiment, public confidence in the Court reasonably may be found to be so high that, 
regardless of who is appointed to fill an existing vacancy, it is very unlikely to fall to a troub-
lesome level in the foreseeable future. A Senator who so viewed public confidence in the 
Court appropriately would regard these as special circumstances making the appointment's 
likely influence as to public confidence in the Court less important than usual. Assume in-
stead that based on indicators such as a diminution in the numbers of cases decided by full 
written opinion or a proliferation of decisions without majority opinions, the Court's deci-
sionmaking process reasonably may be found to be highly inefficient. A Senator who so 
viewed the Court's decisionmaking process would rightly consider these as special circum-
stances making the appointment's likely influence as to the fairness and efficiency of the 
Court's decisionmaking process more important than usual. 
306 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:283 
as to one factor and that factor is entitled to substantially less 
weight than either of the other two? 
In confronting such questions, a Senator cannot help but fall 
back to some extent on intuition. As a guide to intuition, however, 
a Senator may wish to proceed with certain presumptions for situa-
tions that generally appear to militate strongly for or against a find-
ing that the nominee is materially deficient. As a final ingredient of 
my proposed approach, I suggest two such presumptions as particu-
larly appropriate. First, a nominee who is materially deficient as to 
only one factor is not materially deficient overall. Second, a nomi-
nee who is extremely deficient as to one factor is materially deficient 
overall. In my view, absent very substantial disparities in the 
weights assigned to the three factors, a Senator very reasonably 
could treat these presumptions as determinative. 
Ill THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKDROP 
In developing the approach set forth in Parts I and II, I pro-
ceeded on the assumption that a Senator's decision whether to vote 
for or against a Supreme Court nominee should reflect his or her 
informed judgment as to whether the appointment is in the nation's 
best interests. 73 I thereby implicitly rejected two frequently asserted 
limitations on the proper scope of such a decision: First, a Senator 
should not consider an appointment's likely influence as to the out-
come of cases, in general, and the light that a nominee's political 
and social philosophy and attitudes about the judicial role may shed 
on this likely influence, in particular. The President alone has the 
right to try to shape the direction of the Court and to consider ide-
ology and judicial attitudes to that end. 74 Second, in deciding 
(without regard to likely influence as to the outcome of cases) 
whether a nominee is sufficiently well-qualified to deserve appoint-
ment to the Court, a Senator should be concerned with manifest 
unfitness, not promise of excellence. The President is entitled to a 
strong presumption that his or her judgment on the adequacy of the 
nominee's qualifications is correcvs 
I first consider below whether the language of the appoint-
ments clause and the history of its adoption indicate that the clause 
is most reasonably interpreted as allocating to the Senate a role cir-
cumscribed by these two limitations. I then consider the cogency of 
73. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
74. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 22; Goldwater, Political Philosophy and Supreme 
Court Justices, 58 A.B.A.J. 135, 140 (1972); McConnell, supra note 5, at 12-13, 32. 
75. See, e.g., 116 CoNG. REC. 7487 (1970) (remarks of Senator Long during Carswell 
debate); Fein, supra note 5, at 672-73, 687; McConnell, supra note 5, at 33. 
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this interpretation from a more systemic perspective, one that ex-
amines how well it fits into the constitutional scheme. I investigate 
the implications of such an interpretation for the effective function-
ing of the Court as well as its consistency with general constitu-
tional principles and concerns. 
A. LANGUAGE AND HISTORY OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the Constitution provides in 
part that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein 
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law."76 
On their face, these words make clear that the President has an 
initiating role in the appointment process and the Senate a checking 
one. They say nothing, however, as to which factors the President 
or Senate legitimately may take into account for the various types of 
appointments covered. They also contain no suggestion that the 
Senate is limited to a narrower range of factors than the President 
or that the Senate has any duty to defer to the President's judgment 
in evaluating factors within its domain. 11 
If the framers of the Constitution intended that the Senate be 
bound by the two limitations described above, it is surprising to say 
the least that they left no trace of this intent in the words of the 
appointments clause. The natural expectation would be that they 
would have done so, because these limitations would relegate the 
Senate to a decidedly subordinate role in the appointment process. 
The framers' silence in this regard thus gives rise to an inference 
that they had no such intent. 1s 
76. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
77. To the contrary, see McConnell, supra note 5, at 32: 
The President is presumably elected by the people to carry out a program and alter-
ing the ideological directions of the Supreme Court would seem to be a perfectly 
legitimate part of a Presidential platform. To that end, the Constitution gives to 
him the power to nominate. . . . [I]f the power to nominate had been given to the 
Senate, as was considered during the debates at the Constitutional Convention, then 
it would be proper for the Senate to consider political philosophy. 
With all due respect, this inference from the word "nominate" is more than the word can 
bear. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE 1534 (1981) (nominate: "to propose by name for office as a preliminary to appoint-
ment upon approval or confirmation by some person or body < the President ... shall -, 
and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors"). 
78. Cf Black, supra note 16, at 658-59 (discussing meaning of word "advice" in ap-
pointments clause); Simson, Discrimination Against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 387-88 (1979) (discussing inference to 
be drawn from other constitutional language). 
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The history of the clause prior to and roughly contemporane-
ous with the framing also casts doubt on the existence of such an 
intent. 79 The records of the Constitutional Convention indicate a 
general understanding that the clause made the Senate a major 
player, a force to be reckoned with, in the appointment process. On 
June 1, 1787, the Convention, in its initial action on appointments, 
agreed to a provision urged by the proponents of a strong execu-
tive-one authorizing the President to appoint all officers "not 
otherwise provided for."so On June 13, in response to the concerns 
of delegates opposed to a strong executive, a motion was adopted 
that modified this provision by giving the Senate the power to ap-
point judges.s1 On September 4, the Special Committee on Post-
poned Matters reported out a provision that rejected this division of 
appointments between the President and Senate in favor of a divi-
sion of authority in the appointment process: The President would 
nominate and, by and with the Senate's advice and consent, ap-
point.s2 After debate in which the only serious opposition came 
from proponents of a strong executive,s3 this provision won final 
adoption.84 In its final form, the clause therefore represented an 
important compromise between the supporters and opponents of a 
strong executive-a compromise in which the supporters yielded 
substantially more ground than a conception of the Senate's role as 
circumscribed by the two limitations under discussion would 
suggest.ss 
The debates in the state ratifying conventions offer no real ba-
sis for inferring either the existence or nonexistence of an original 
intent that the Senate abide by these two limitations. The appoint-
ments clause was rarely discussed, and on the few occasions when it 
was, it was characterized in very different ways. While some 
claimed that it granted the executive monarchical powers, others 
79. For a remarkably summary attempt to use history to establish such an intent, see 
Fein, supra note 5, at 672-73 (deducing the "Hamiltonian model of the Senate's confirmation 
power" from two lines of THE FEDERALIST and then simply characterizing this model as 
"the Framers' vision"). For general discussion of the role of history in constitutional inter-
pretation, see C. MILLER, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE UsES OF HISTORY (1969); Kelly, 
Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REv. 119; Simson, The Role of 
History in Constitutional Interpretation: A Cose Study, 70 CoRNELL L. REv. 253 (1985); 
Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 502 (1964). 
80. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 66-67 (M. Farrand 
ed. 1911). 
81. /d. at 232-33. 
82. 2 id. at 498. 
83. See. e.g .• id. at 538-39 (remarks of James Wilson). 
8-4. /d. at 539. 
85. See generally J. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 17-25. 
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maintained that it made the President subservient to the Senate.86 
Hamilton's three essays in The Federalist addressing the 
clause87 provide the strongest support for locating these two limita-
tions within original intent. According to one commentator, each 
of these essays "emphasizes that the Senate would exercise a high 
level of deference toward the president's appointment. "88 Accord-
ing to another, the essays describe the Senate's role as "limited to a 
passive review of the qualifications of the persons nominated by the 
President. "89 
For several reasons, however, the support that these essays in 
fact provide for locating the limitations within original intent is rel-
atively meager. First, the essays are hardly free from ambiguity. 
They easily may be read as authority for a Senate role substantially 
less deferential than the one these commentators describe.90 Thus, 
read in isolation, passages such as the following may appear to offer 
impressive support for a high degree of Senate deference: 
[A]s [Senators'] dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, 
and might have the appearance of a reftection upon the judgment of the chief magis-
trate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not 
special and strong reasons for the refusal. 91 
Read alongside passages such as the one below, however, these 
passages seem to become materially less potent as authority for a 
sharply circumscribed Senate role: 
If by [the Senate's] inftuencing the President be meant restraining him, this is pre-
cisely what must have been intended. . . . [T]he restraint would be salutary, at the 
same time that it would not be such as to destroy a single advantage to be looked for 
from the uncontrolled agency of that Magistrate. The right of nomination would 
produce all the good of that of appointment, and would in a great measure avoid its 
evils.92 
Second, whatever the degree of senatorial deference these essays 
may indicate is due, they nowhere assert that the Senate is any more 
limited than the President in the range of factors that it may take 
into account. Third, as a staunch proponent of a strong executive, 
Hamilton may fairly be suspected of at least subconsciously shading 
the truth in favor of executive power in his rendition of the intent 
behind the clause.93 
86. See id. at 25-26. 
87. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 66, 76, & 77 (A. Hamilton). 
88. Ross, supra note 16, at 641. 
89. J. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 18. 
90. See, e.g., Black, supra note 16, at 661-62; Grossman & Wasby, The Senate and 
Supreme Coun Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DUKE L.J. 557, 560-61 & n.l3. 
91. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 494 (A. Hamilton) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). 
92. Id. No. 77, at 498 (A. Hamilton). 
93. See Ross, supra note 16, at 641. 
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Two writings much less celebrated than The Federalist, but 
also roughly contemporaneous with the framing, tend to belie any 
original intent that the Senate observe the two limitations in ques-
tion. One is a letter from John Adams to Roger Sherman in the fall 
of 1789; the other is an entry by President Washington in his diary 
in August 1789. 
In his letter to Sherman, Adams criticized the division of au-
thority established by the appointments clause. According to Ad-
ams, the authority should have been placed in the President's hands 
alone. The following passage from the letter indicates rather clearly 
that Adams regarded the Senate's role as substantially more signifi-
cant than the two purported limitations would allow: 
[The requirement of Senate confirmation) lessens the responsibility of the Execu-
tive. . . . The blame of an injudicious, weak or wicked appointment, is shared so 
much between him and the Senate that his part will be too smaJl.94 
The relevant entry by Washington in his diary was his record 
of the views that he had expressed that day to a committee of the 
Senate. The committee had been appointed to discuss with Wash-
ington a question of appropriate appointment procedure: should 
the President submit nominations to the Senate in writing or instead 
submit them in person and remain for the Senate's debate and vote? 
In urging the propriety of the former procedure, Washington re-
vealed a conception of the Senate's role in the appointment process 
essentially incompatible with the two limitations at issue: 
[I)t could be no pleasing thing I conceive, for the President, on the one hand to be 
present and hear the propriety of his nominations questioned; nor for the Senate on 
the other hand to be under the smallest restraint from his presence from the fullest 
and freest inquiry into the Character of the Person nominated. The President in a 
situation like this would be reduced to one of two things: either to be a silent wit-
ness of the decision by ballot, if there are objections to the nomination; or in justifi-
cation thereof (if he should think it right) to support it by argument. Neither of 
which might be agreeable; and the latter improper; for as the President has a right 
to nominate without assigning his reasons, so has the Senate a right to dissent with-
out giving theirs. 95 
Because Adams was not a delegate to the Constitutional Con-
vention, his understanding of the appointments clause arguably is 
not a very good guide to the framers' intent. In addition, because 
Adams, like Hamilton, was a firm proponent of a strong executive, 
he too may be suspected of a certain lack of objectivity on the mat-
ter at hand. Hamilton, obliged to describe the clause uncritically in 
his adopted role in The Federalist of defender of the Constitution, 
94. 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 427 (C. Adams ed. 1852-65). 
95. 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 373-74 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1931-44). 
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may have allowed his bias to manifest itself in an unduly pro-execu-
tive rendition of original intent. On the other hand, Adams, free in 
his letter to vent his displeasure with the resolution reached, argua-
bly permitted his bias to show itself in a rendition of original intent 
that exaggerated the authority yielded to the Senate. 
The significance of Washington's diary entry is far more diffi-
cult to discount. Washington, of course, was not only present at the 
Constitutional Convention; he presided over it. Furthermore, his 
claim to objectivity in expressing the view that he stated to the Sen-
ate committee is rather formidable: As President, he would seem to 
have had an interest in acknowledging to the committee a much 
narrower scope of Senate authority than he did.96 
Two instances in which the Senate rejected nominations by 
President Washington provide further reason to doubt that the two 
asserted limitations have any roots in original intent. As the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged on a number of occasions,97 Con-
gress's actions in the early years of the Republic offer important 
insight into the intent behind the Constitution's various provi-
sions.9s With so many of its members having participated in the 
Constitutional Convention or a state ratifying convention, Congress 
in these early years presumably acted with a high degree of aware-
ness of the intended constitutional bounds. 
The first instance, which came in the First Congress's first 
year, vividly illustrates that the Senate did not consider itself 
obliged to adopt a highly deferential pose. The nominee rejected 
was Benjamin Fishboum, the President's choice for naval officer of 
the Port of Savannah, Georgia. The Senate did not reject 
96. Cf K. BROUN, G. DIX, E. GELLHORN, D. KAYE, R. MEISENHOLDER, E. ROB-
ERTS, & J. STRONG, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE§§ 276, 279 (E. Oeary 3d ed. 1984) (dis-
cussing the traditional exception in hearsay law allowing into evidence hearsay statements 
that are declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interest and explaining the exception as 
resting in part on the special reliability thought to inhere in statements against interest). 
97. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983); Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 136 (1926); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888); Cooley v. Board 
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319-20 (1851). 
98. I emphasize that this "important insight" cannot simply be regarded as determina-
tive. It needs to be placed in proper perspective. In particular, as Justice Brennan has 
pointed out, "[l]egislators, influenced by the passions and exigencies of the moment, the pres-
sure of constituents and colleagues, and the press of business, do not always pass sober consti-
tutional judgment on every piece of legislation they enact, and this must be assumed to be as 
true of the Members of the First Congress as any other." Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 
814-15 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "the Constitution is not a static docu-
ment whose meaning on every detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Fram-
ers .... To be truly faithful to the Framers, 'our use of the history of their time must limit 
itself to broad purposes, not specific practices.'" Id. at 816 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). See generally C. MILLER, 
supra note 79, at 52-70. 
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Fishboum because of any strong conviction that he was unfit for the 
post. Rather, it did so because the two Senators from Georgia had 
made it known to their colleagues that they had a candidate whom 
they preferred. The day after the nomination was defeated Wash-
ington responded to this initial exercise of "Senatorial courtesy" by 
nominating the person favored by the Georgia Senators.99 
The second instance, which took place in 1795, directly casts 
doubt on the purported limitation that the Senate must vote on a 
nominee to the Supreme Court without regard to likely infiuence as 
to the outcome of cases, in general, and the light that the nominee's 
ideology and judicial attitudes may shed on that infiuence, in partic-
ular. On this occasion, the unsuccessful nominee was the well-
known John Rutledge, the President's choice to be Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court.too Federalist Senators led the attack on the 
nomination, and they based their opposition primarily on Rut-
ledge's outspoken criticism of the recently ratified Jay Treaty with 
Great Britain. Although this opposition centered on a particular 
issue, it reflected both broad-based disagreement with the nominee's 
ideology and general concern about the appointment's likely infiu-
ence as to the outcome of cases. As Charles Warren explained in 
commenting on the Rutledge rejection, "owing to the violent revolt 
against its terms by the anti-British faction in this country, support 
of the treaty was regarded by [the Federalists] as the touchstone of 
true Federalism."wt 
B. SYSTEMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
In the preceding section, I have suggested that the language 
and history of the appointments clause militate against recognition 
of the two limitations in question. I suggest here that, on balance, 
systemic considerations do the same. After discussing three consid-
erations that I believe weigh quite heavily against recognition, I ad-
dress the principal considerations that have been raised in favor. 
1. The general role of representatives.-The framers of the 
Constitution nowhere provided that the people's elected national 
representatives should exercise their decisionmaking authority in 
the manner that, upon deliberation, they determine to be in the na-
tion's best interests. Some of the framers no doubt adhered to con-
99. The history and scope of Senatorial courtesy are discussed in H. ABRAHAM, supra 
note 2, at 26-29; J. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 215·37. 
100. Rutledge was one of the original members of the Supreme Court but, in a move that 
attests to the Court's limited prestige and allure before John Marshall took over at the helm, 
had resigned in 1791 to become chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court. 
101. 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME CoURT IN UNITED STATES HISrORY 129 (rev. ed. 
1926). 
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ceptions of representation substantially different from this 
deliberative, nationally-minded one-conceptions, for example, 
such as the pluralist one of representatives as essentially charged 
with making decisions responsive to the pressures placed on them 
by their constituents.102 If, however, The Federalist may be re-
garded as accurately capturing the conception of representation 
prevalent among the framers, the deliberative, nationally-minded 
conception of representation has a significantly stronger claim than 
any other to describing the intended role of national representa-
tives.toJ Various passages in The Federalist reflect this conception. 
For example, one essay speaks of representative government as serv-
ing to "refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through 
the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best 
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and 
love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or par-
tial considerations."t04 Similarly, another essay maintains that 
"[t]he aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to 
obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and 
most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society." tos 
This deliberative, nationally-minded conception of representa-
tion may well have less power than a pluralist one to explain how 
our national representatives have exercised their decisionmaking 
authority in the 200 years since the Constitution was adopted. Its 
normative importance, however, seems undeniable. Not only was 
the conception widely shared among the framers; it apparently also 
was quite influential in shaping their work. As Cass Sunstein has 
argued, the way in which the Constitution structures the national 
government and the federal-state relationship is explicable at least 
in part as an attempt to "bring about public-spirited representation" 
and to "provide safeguards in its absence."t06 
The two limitations under discussion deny what this general 
conception of representation affirms: that a national representa-
tive's decisions should reflect his or her considered judgment as to 
the course of action in the nation's best interests. In light of the 
stature of this general conception, its incompatibility with the two 
limitations significantly disfavors their recognition. 
2. Separation of powers.-Where the appointment of officers 
in the executive branch is concerned, it is not at all inconsistent to 
102. See generally R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956). 
103. See Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-45 
(1985). 
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (J. Madison) (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937). 
105. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 370 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison). 
106. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 43. 
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adhere to both of the following propositions: Senators have a duty 
to make an informed judgment as to whether the appointment is in 
the nation's best interests; and Senators should give the President a 
great deal of leeway to appoint people to his or her ideological lik-
ing. Very simply, the job of executive officers is to serve the Presi-
dent, to help the President realize his or her goals. As a result, 
Senators making an informed judgment with regard to such ap-
pointments sensibly recognize as a good that the appointee is ideo-
logically compatible with the President and leave to the President 
the question whether the nominee is sufficiently ideologically com-
patible with the President to serve him or her well.101 
If the job of Supreme Court Justices were to serve the Presi-
dent, a similar case could be made for allowing the President a free 
hand to appoint Justices to his or her ideological liking. Clearly, 
however, this is very much not their job.1os They are supposed to 
be sufficiently independent of the President to be able to judge ob-
jectively the constitutionality of executive acts. By refusing to leave 
solely to the President consideration of a nominee's ideology and 
the appointment's likely influence as to the outcome of cases, Sena-
tors help ensure that the Court has this degree of independence of 
the President and that it does not decide cases as if serving the Pres-
ident were its job.109 
3. Legitimacy of judicial review.-Unelected and essentially 
guaranteed life tenure, the Justices of the Supreme Court enjoy an 
insulation from popular pressures that enables them to evaluate the 
constitutionality of acts of the people's elected representatives much 
more thoughtfully and dispassionately than those representatives 
reasonably could be expected to do. 110 In a society committed to 
democratic principles, however, important questions of legitimacy 
arise when these officials not chosen by the people nor subject to 
popular recall exercise their judicial review authority in a manner 
significantly at odds with majority sentiment.111 The process by 
which the Justices are appointed stands as a principal, if not the 
principal, protection against serious disparity between the will of 
the majority and the way in which the Justices exercise their au-
thority of judicial review.m Though not elected by the people, the 
107. See Black, supra note 16, at 660. 
108. See generally Symposium: The American Constitutional Tradition of Shared and 
Separated Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 209 (1989). 
109. See Black, supra note 16, at 660; see generally Biden, The Constitution, the Senate, 
and the Court, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 951 (1989). 
llO. See C. BLACK, supra note 44, at 173-78. 
lll. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962). 
112. See Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Pol-
icy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279, 283-86 (1957); Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a 
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Justices must be nominated by a President and confirmed by a Sen-
ate who are. When these officials responsive to and representative 
of the people take into account how positive or negative an influ-
ence an appointment is likely to have with regard to the outcome of 
cases, the probability of such a disparity is greatly diminished.tt3 
If, in accordance with one of the two limitations in question, 
only the President takes this factor into account, the protection 
against such a disparity is materially less.tt4 An appointment pro-
cess in which both the President and Senate consider this factor 
necessitates some accommodation on the President's part to the 
type of influence in this regard that a majority of the Senate would 
like to see. It requires the President in making a nomination to 
gravitate to some extent away from his or her ideological base and 
toward the ideological center of the Senate. As a result, it offers 
greater assurance than a process in which only the President consid-
ers this factor that the persons appointed will be ones who will exer-
cise their judicial review authority in a manner that does not vary 
dramatically from the wishes of the majority. 
4. Prolonged vacancies.-An appointment process in which 
the Senate does not abide by the two limitations in question 
promises to result in longer delays in filling vacancies than a process 
in which the Senate takes these limitations to heart. Very simply, 
the likelihood is enhanced that the Senate will reject a nominee and 
require the President to come forward with another for the Senate 
to consider anew. For a combination of reasons, however, this po-
tential for longer delays in filling vacancies does not appear to mili-
tate significantly in favor of recognizing the two limitations. 
First, a potential for longer delays in filling vacancies is proba-
bly not a weighty consideration unless it means that vacancies are 
likely to remain unfilled for all or most of a term of the Court.tts A 
Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CORNELL L. REV. I, 9-11 (1968). 
Other forms of protection are noted in Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 6! S. CAL 
L. REV. 1571, 1572 (1988); Wright, supra, at II. 
113. In taking the distinctive position that neither the Senate nor the President should 
take into account likely influence as to the outcome of cases, Stephen Carter loses sight of this 
consideration. Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1193-94, 1197 n.l9 
(1988). Carter essentially derives his position from the principle that the Supreme Court 
should serve as a "countermajoritarian brake" (id. at 1193). So doing, he in effect wrongly 
exalts this principle of "countermajoritarian brake" at the expense of what Alexander Bickel 
termed the "countermajoritarian difficulty" (A. BICKEL, supra note Ill, at 16) and leaves no 
room for the vital role that presidential and Senate participation in the appointment process 
plays in alleviating this difficulty. 
114. See Black, supra note 16, at 660; Monaghan, supra note 17, at 1203, 1207-08. 
115. For a decidedly more urgent view of such vacancies, see Text of President's Address 
on Foreign and Domestic Issues, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1987, at AS, col. I ("As soon as the 
Senate returns from its recess next month, it should consider Judge Bork's qualifications, and 
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vacancy on the Court while it is in session is always somewhat prob-
lematic. It may cause the Court to divide evenly on some cases and 
not reach a majority result. In addition, it may cause the Court to 
some degree to deliberate less fully and speak with less authority.u6 
Affirmances by an equally divided Court, however, are hardly a 
phenomenon limited to occasions on which a vacancy exists on the 
Court. They also occur at times as a result of recusals and absences 
due to illness.111 The prospect that for several months they will 
arise with greater frequency than usual is not a pleasant one, but 
neither does it seem cause for great concern.us Moreover, if the 
Justices believe in a specific instance that an affirmance by an 
equally divided Court would be particularly problematic, they al-
ways have the option of setting the case for reargument when the 
vacancy has been filled. 
The possibility that a vacancy may cause the Court to deliber-
ate somewhat less fully and speak with somewhat less authority is 
not entirely hypothetical. It does not seem sufficiently substantial, 
however, to be a basis for serious concern. Indeed, if, as the Court 
has assured us, there is nothing so special about having a criminal 
jury of twelve that we should feel materially less confident in the 
nature of the deliberations and the validity of the verdict rendered 
by a jury of six,u9 it is difficult to imagine that we should be wor-
ried about a drop in quality of the Court's work when its member-
ship falls to eight or even seven. 
Second, vacancies are not likely to remain unfilled for all or 
most of a Supreme Court Term under an appointment process in 
which Senators fail to observe the two limitations at issue.12o Both 
the President and the Senate have too much to lose to allow the 
process to degenerate into a battle of wills in which the President 
comes forward with one after another nominee unpalatable to a ma-
jority of Senators and the Senate proceeds to vote the nominee 
down. The weight of other business, public pressure to bring the 
Court to full strength, and other practical realities can be expected 
to drive the President and Senate toward mutual accommodation. 
then vote yes or no, up or down. This nation and its citizens deserve a full bench with nine 
justices when the Court convenes in October"). 
116. See Friedman, supra note 22, at 1316. 
117. For example, in the Court's 1984-85 Term, when Justice Powell was absent from 
the bench for ten weeks due to illness, there were eight such affirmances and five more were 
avoided by setting the cases for reargument. See Taylor, Tie Vote: What Happens, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 5, 1987, at B9, col. 3. 
118. Cf id ("The Court has been short one or more members at various times in the past 
without any great problems resulting"). 
119. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
120. But see Friedman, supra note 22, at 1316-17. 
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In selecting an initial nominee, the President may misestimate the 
extent to which it is necessary to deviate from his or her preferences 
to secure Senate approval, or the President simply may decide to 
take a substantial risk of rejection. In observing this nominee's de-
feat, however, the President acquires both a better understanding of 
the distance between his or her preferences and those of a majority 
of the Senate and a substantially stronger set of incentives to meet 
the Senate at least halfway. In short, with or without the two limi-
tations in question, the spectre of Supreme Court vacancies lying 
unfilled for long periods of time as a series of nominees are put for-
ward and voted down seems highly remote.121 
5. Access to, and competence to assess, relevant information.-
In arguing against serious consideration by the Senate of an ap-
pointment's likely influence as to the outcome of cases, Richard 
Friedman maintains that the Senate is "less likely than the Presi-
dent and his advisers to know the nominee intimately" as well as 
"less able to consider the nominee's record reflectively."t22 If, as 
Friedman seems to be suggesting, the Senate has less access to, and 
competence to assess, relevant information than the President, a 
Senator's role in evaluating likely influence as to the outcome of 
cases should not necessarily be nonexistent. It should, however, be 
narrowly limited-probably limited to taking into account whether, 
in the Senator's view, the nominee is extremely deficient in this re-
spect. In addition, a Senator would also seem obliged to give great 
deference to the President's implicit judgment that the nominee is 
well-qualified in other respects. 
Although Senators generally may be on less familiar terms 
than the President with the nominee, it is dubious that they gener-
ally have less access to information bearing on the wisdom of ap-
pointing him or her to the Court. Indeed, it may well be that they 
121. A consideration that might be argued in tandem with prolonged vacancies is inter-
ference with other Senate duties. Both proceed on the assumption that nonadherence to the 
two limitations is apt to result in frequent Senate rejection of Supreme Court nominees. As 
suggested above, however, it is far from clear that nonadherence to the limitations means that 
the process typically will include rejection of at least one nominee and perhaps two or three. 
The President has the ability to make reasonable accommodation for Senate preferences in his 
or her choice of even an initial nominee, and both the President and Senate have interests in 
ensuring that the process does not drag on. Another reason why interference with other 
Senate duties is not a material consideration here lies in the importance of the task at hand. 
Basically, if nonadherence to the limitations does not cause the Senate to devote an amount of 
time to Supreme Court appointments disproportionate to the relative importance of such 
business, the fact that it means less time for other Senate business does not seem a weighty 
concern. For reasons indicated at the outset of this article, see supra text accompanying note 
24, I submit that the business of confirming Supreme Court nominees ranks sufficiently high 
in importance on the Senate's list of activities to create a strong presumption against any 
claim that this consideration is material. 
122. Friedman, supra note 22, at 1313. 
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generally have more. Most obviously, the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee hearings take place only after the President has indicated the 
person of his or her choice. Perhaps these hearings often do not 
reveal anything materially related to the wisdom of the appointment 
that the President did not already know. It is difficult to believe, 
however, that they do not do so at least at times. Moreover, to the 
extent that the general trend in the hearings has been toward more 
probing investigation, 123 they can be expected to prove more eye-
opening for Presidents in years to come.l24 Another, and perhaps 
even more important, source of post-nomination information is the 
press. 12s As Judge Ginsburg had the misfortune of learning, 126 the 
most relentless of investigators is almost certainly the press, and the 
press typically does not bring to bear the full force of its investiga-
tory powers until its list of persons rumored to be possible nominees 
is superseded by an official list of one.121 
The notion that the Senate is any less competent than the Pres-
ident to assess the wide range of information relevant to appointing 
someone to the Court is also open to serious doubt.l2s There seems 
no firm basis for regarding one as any more or less competent than 
the other. On the one hand, being somewhat more insulated from 
interest-group pressures, the President and his or her advisers may 
have a greater capacity for dispassionate reflection. On the other 
123. See generally Freund, supra note 31; Ross, supra note 16. 
124. For commentary strongly supportive of an aggressive committee role, see 
Totenberg, supra note 33. 
125. See id. 
126. See Roberts, Ginsburg Withdraws Name As Supreme Court Nominee, Citing Mari-
juana 'Clamor,' N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, at AI, col. 6; Taylor, Haste and Ideological Fights 
Set Nomination on Course Ending in Its Doom, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, at A34, col. 1. 
127. The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary has va-
ried in the timing of its reports, depending on whether prior to nomination the Administra-
tion notified the committee of possible nominees and requested its evaluation of them. On the 
shifts in Administration practice since 1956-tbe year that the committee began evaluating 
actual or potential Supreme Court nominees-see H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 35-38. 
128. See [R.] Ginsburg, Confirming Supreme Court Justices: Thoughts on the Second 
Opinion Rendered by the Senate, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 101, 111-12. Writing recently in the 
Harvard Law Review, Bruce Fein argued not that the Senate is less competent than the Presi-
dent to make this assessment but instead the more extreme position that it is simply incompe-
tent to do so: 
The Senate, simply stated, is ill-suited intellectually, morally, and politically to pass 
on anything more substantive than a nominee's professional fitness for the office of 
Supreme Court Justice .... (S]enators tend to be intellectually shallow and result-
oriented. 
Fein, supra note 5, at 673. I obviously do not share Fein's dismal view of the Senate, and be 
says virtually nothing that might persuade me to share it. He offers this stinging indictment 
of Senators' abilities essentially in the form of a bald assertion. Perhaps Senators can derive 
some measure of comfort from the fact that Fein appears to hold most members of the 
Supreme Court for the past fifty years in similarly low esteem. See Fein, Errar in the Court, 
75 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1989, at 56. 
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hand, being less homogeneous in its views, the Senate may be sensi-
tive to a broader range of relevant considerations. 
6. Judicial quality.-In opposing active Senate consideration 
of an appointment's likely influence as to the outcome of cases, 
Friedman also suggests that it "might more often lead in the long 
run to the rejection of nominees like Brandeis and Hughes-two of 
'this century's most esteemed Justices' ... -and to the selection 0f 
mediocrities."t29 The difference between "nominees like Brandeis 
and Hughes" and "mediocrities" is sufficiently large that more re-
jections of nominees like Brandeis and Hughes need not mean more 
selections of mediocrities. For purposes of discussion, I therefore 
treat the above as two distinct suggestions-first, that active consid-
eration of the sort described leads to fewer Justices who serve with 
great distinction, and second, that it leads to more mediocrities on 
the Court. 
Friedman is most obviously on shaky ground here in sug-
gesting that active Senate consideration of likely influence as to the 
outcome of cases leads to more "mediocrities" on the Court. He 
tacitly assumes that a Justice's mediocrity or excellence should be 
measured in terms of factors more objective than how positive or 
negative an influence the Justice has had as to the outcome of cases. 
It is dubious, however, that a Justice's quality can properly be mea-
sured without giving substantial weight to this rather subjective but, 
as argued in Parts I and II, highly relevant factor. Under this view, 
active Senate consideration of this factor is actually essential to 
avoid "mediocrities" on the Court. 
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that Friedman's mea-
sure of judicial quality is sound, his conclusion that active Senate 
consideration of likely influence as to the outcome of cases leads to 
more mediocrities on the Court still does not follow. On the one 
hand, there is no reason to suppose that, either in anticipation of 
active Senate consideration of this factor or in response to the Sen-
ate's rejection of a nominee based largely on its active consideration 
of the factor, the President suddenly would become indifferent in 
selecting a nominee as to whether he or she is apt on the Court to be 
a "mediocrity," as Friedman uses the term. On the other hand, if, 
as I propose in Parts I and II, Senators take seriously not only likely 
influence as to the outcome of cases but also likely influence as to 
public confidence in the Court and as to the fairness and efficiency 
of the Court's decisionmaking process, there is no reason to suppose 
that they will allow onto the Court any nominees who promise to be 
129. Friedman, supra note 22, at 1286. 
320 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 7:283 
what Friedman would call "mediocrities."l3o 
Friedman's suggestion that active Senate consideration of 
likely influence as to the outcome of cases leads to fewer Justices 
who serve with great distinction is more difficult to discount. Ac-
tive Senate consideration of this factor undoubtedly does give rise to 
the possibility that the Senate will reject some nominees who would 
serve with great distinction in terms of factors more objective than 
influence as to the outcome of cases.l31 For several reasons, how-
ever, this possibility is not particularly troubling and does not weigh 
materially against active consideration of likely influence as to the 
outcome of cases. 
First, the rejection of a nominee who would serve with great 
distinction in terms of factors more objective than influence as to 
the outcome of cases does not necessarily mean that the Court will 
be without someone who would serve with great distinction. It 
means this only if one assumes along with Friedman that the degree 
of distinction with which a Justice serves should be measured "ob-
jectively" without regard to the Justice's influence as to the out-
come of cases. As argued above, 132 however, such an assumption 
seems unwarranted. 
Second, although active Senate consideration of likely influence 
as to the outcome of cases may lead to the rejection of some nomi-
nees who would serve with great distinction in terms of more objec-
tive factors, it by no means follows that it frequently will have this 
effect. In particular, it may be expected to have this effect quite 
infrequently if the nominees' promise of such distinction is rela-
tively apparent and if Senators in evaluating nominees generally ad-
here to the basic contours of the approach proposed in this article. 
On the one hand, Senators virtually could not help but find with a 
high degree of certainty that nominees strongly evidencing this 
promise rank very high in terms of both likely influence as to public 
confidence in the Court and likely influence as to the fairness and 
efficiency of the Court's decisionmaking process.m On the other 
130. I am assuming that a Justice's influence as to public confidence in the Court and his 
or her influence as to the fairness and efficiency of the Court's decisionmaking process are the 
type of more objective factors that Friedman has in mind and that would figure prominently 
in his estimate of a Justice's quality. If this assumption is incorrect, then my objections to 
Friedman's conception of judicial quality are even more broad-based. With regard to the 
more objective nature of these two factors, see supra text following note 69. 
131. It also gives rise to the possibility that the President in anticipation of a rejection 
will fail to nominate persons meeting this description. If I am correct below, however, in 
discounting the significance of the possibility mentioned in the text, the limited significance of 
this possibility would seem to follow. 
132. See supra text accompanying notes 129 and 130. 
133. See supra note 130. 
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hand, since nominees strongly evidencing this promise almost inva-
riably would be quite openminded, 134 Senators typically would not 
have a great deal of confidence in their assessment of likely influ-
ence as to the outcome of cases and therefore would tend to dis-
count it.m Under the circumstances, unless a majority of Senators 
viewed the nominee as extremely deficient with regard to likely in-
fluence as to the outcome of cases, the nomination almost certainly 
would prevail. 
Lastly, although active Senate consideration of likely influence 
as to the outcome of cases may prevent the President from putting 
some persons on the Court who would serve with great distinction 
in terms of more objective factors, it also may have a very opposite, 
and patently very salutary, effect. It may force the President to 
think about nominating various persons who show obvious promise 
of such distinction but whom the President, if left to his or her own 
ideological preferences, would not seriously consider. 
7. Politicization of the Court.-Friedman also argues that 
overt Senate consideration of likely influence as to the outcome of 
cases is undesirable because it tends to make the public and the Jus-
tices themselves see the Court as merely another political deci-
sionmaker.B6 Although this argument does not directly militate 
against Senators tacitly taking into account likely influence as to the 
outcome of cases, it does do so indirectly. If Senators cannot openly 
inquire in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings into an appoint-
ment's likely influence in this regard and openly debate it on the 
Senate floor, their ability to assess it accurately-and, hence, the 
defensibility of their attempting to assess it-is significantly 
diminished. m 
Friedman's concern about the public perception of the Court is 
ill-founded. It is not at all apparent that the Senate's overt inquiry 
into and debate about likely influence as to the outcome of cases 
broadly conveys the message that the Justices are essentially a 
group of political actors, deciding cases basically by voting their 
policy preferences. More likely, the message generally conveyed is 
134. See supra note 62 and text accompanying notes 58, 59, and 62. 
135. See supra text accompanying notes 46 and 47. 
136. Friedman, supra note 22, at 1317-18. Along similar lines, see Mikva, supra note 33, 
at 39. 
137. The discussion below takes as a given the openness of the hearings and floor debate. 
Oosing them to the public would respond partially to Friedman's concerns, but the option of 
doing so today is, if not unconstitutional (cf Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 
U.S. 596 (1982) (first amendment right of access)), at least politically unthinkable. Until 
1929 the Senate considered all nominations for federal office in closed executive session, un-
less there was a two-thirds vote requiring otherwise in a particular instance. See Freund, 
supra note 31, at 1157-58. 
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a very different one: that the Constitution allows substantial room 
for reasonable differences of opinion as to its proper interpretation, 
and that a Justice's interpretation of the Constitution cannot help 
but be influenced to some degree by his or her political and social 
philosophy. 
Furthermore, to the extent that overt Senate inquiry into and 
debate about likely influence as to the outcome of cases may natu-
rally tend to convey the former message, Senators can counter this 
tendency quite effectively by the way in which they conduct these 
inquiries and debates. Basically, Senators need to take the time to 
put their questions and comments in proper perspective. They must 
make clear to the public, for example, why the nominee's political 
and social philosophy is a relevant concern and how much signifi-
cance they assign it in their confirmation decision. If, in providing 
this perspective, Senators are guided by the approach set forth 
above in Parts I and II, the likelihood that the inquiry and debate 
will communicate the former message would appear to be fairly 
minimal. 
Finally, in one important respect, overt Senate consideration of 
likely influence as to the outcome of cases actually has positive 
value in helping avoid a public perception of the Court as a highly 
political decisionmaker. Presidents often have made no secret of 
the fact that they take likely influence as to the outcome of cases 
into account in selecting a nominee.tJs By openly inquiring into 
and debating this factor, the Senate makes clear to the public that 
the President does not have a free hand to place on the Court per-
sons to his or her ideological liking. So doing, it helps ensure that 
the public sees the Court as independent of the President, rather 
than as an extension of the President's will. 
Friedman is no more persuasive in objecting to overt Senate 
consideration of likely influence as to the outcome of cases because 
of its possible impact on the Court's perception of itself. In his 
view, such consideration fosters among the Justices a political per-
ception of their role and thereby makes them more political in their 
decisionmaking. First of all, however, if Senators inquire into and 
debate this factor in a manner basically consistent with the ap-
proach set forth in Parts I and II, it is difficult to imagine that the 
nominee or the Justices already on the Court would understand the 
inquiry and debate as indicating that Justices are expected to vote in 
an essentially political way. The distinction between a message that 
Justices should vote according to their policy preferences and a 
message that Justices cannot help but be influenced to some degree 
138. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 2, at 67-68. 
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by their political and social philosophies may be too subtle for some 
members of the public to grasp. It is well within the grasp, how-
ever, of anyone with sufficient legal acumen to be nominated to the 
Court. 
Second, even if Senators do inquire into and debate likely influ-
ence as to the outcome of cases in a way that suggests that Justices 
should be highly political in their decisionmaking, it is dubious that 
the nominee, once seated on the Court, will take the suggestion to 
heart or that the Justices already on the Court will do so. They are 
not apt to regard the Senate as nearly as expert as themselves on the 
topic of proper criteria for judicial decisionmaking. In addition, es-
sentially guaranteed life tenure, they are not likely to feel under any 
particular pressure to adopt the Senate's view. 
Lastly, if conducted properly, Senate inquiry into and debate 
about likely influence as to the outcome of cases actually may tend 
to make the Justices less political in their decisionmaking. By 
bringing into the open a nominee's political and social philosophy, 
the Senate may make the nominee more sensitive when on the 
Court to the extent to which this personal philosophy may exert an 
undue influence on his or her decisionmaking. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since 1900, the Senate has rejected only about one out of ten 
Supreme Court nominations.I39 Though not nearly as low as the 
concurrent rejection rate for Cabinet nominations,I40 this rate is 
sufficiently low to suggest that the Senate during these years gener-
ally has been content to adopt a notably deferential pose. In addi-
tion, most observers would agree that this relatively low rejection 
rate owes a great deal more to Senate acquiescence than to presiden-
139. There have been 58 nominations since 1900. Four were voted down by the Senate 
(Parker in 1930, Haynsworth in 1969, Carswell in 1970, and Bork in 1987); one was with-
drawn in the face of a Senate filibuster (Fortas in 1968 for promotion to Chief Justice); and 
one was withdrawn after revelations in the press that virtually ensured defeat (Ginsburg in 
1987). I count all six of these unsuccessful nominations as "rejections." See J. HARRIS, supra 
note 58, at 302-03 (characterizing as "rejections" not only nominations formally rejected but 
also ones withdrawn by the President or not acted on by the Senate); McKay, supra note 33, 
at 130 (same). I do not count as a rejection the failure of the Thornberry nomination in 1968, 
because it was simply a consequence of the rejection of the Fortas nomination with which it 
had been paired. With Justice Fortas remaining on the Court as an Associate Justice rather 
than moving up to succeed Earl Warren as Chief Justice, the Associate Justice seat for which 
Judge Thornberry had been nominated failed to open up. (When Chief Justice Warren re-
sponded to the failure of the Fortas nomination by withdrawing his resignation, the apparent 
vacancy in the Chief Justice's chair also disappeared.) 
140. See J. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 259; Oreskes, Senate Rejects Tower, 53-47; First 
Cabinet Veto Since '59, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1989, at AI, col. 6. 
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tial restraint.t4t 
At first glance this twentieth-century history may appear to 
constitute a significant counterweight to arguments for the type of 
approach that I have proposed for Senate confirmation of Supreme 
Court nominees. It is unclear, however, why Senators should give 
this modem history substantial weight. It belies not only the au-
thority that Senators apparently were intended to exercise, t42 but 
also the authority that they in fact did exercise for many years: The 
rejection rate for Supreme Court nominations was much more for-
midable prior to 1900 than since-roughly one out offour.t43 To be 
sure, this modem history is of a piece with other developments 
marking a significant shift in power in this century away from Con-
gress and toward the President.t44 Moreover, perhaps there are cer-
tain matters with regard to which Senators only sensibly and 
responsibly define the scope of their constitutional authority by giv-
ing substantial weight to a shift in power that has taken place. It is 
far from apparent, however, that the appointment of Supreme 
Court Justices is such a matter. Absent serious argument to the 
contrary, it seems appropriate to assume that it is not. 
In closing, I emphasize one implication of this article that its 
title and principal focus may tend to obscure: Senators are not the 
only participants in the Supreme Court appointment process who 
should feel a responsibility to exercise their decisionmaking author-
ity with the nation's best interests foremost in mind. The President 
should as well. I have framed my proposal in terms of the Senate's 
role in the process largely because the relevant debate historically 
has centered on the Senate's, rather than the President's, appropri-
ate role. For reasons that should be apparent from my arguments 
in support of the proposal, however, I believe that the proposal also 
provides the basic ingredients for the nominating approach that a 
President should follow. 
141. See, e.g., Grossman & Wasby, supra note 90, at 559, 587-88; Monaghan, supra note 
17, at 1202-03; Totenberg, supra note 33, at 1213. Tempting as it may be to see in the rejec-
tion in 1987 of the Bork nomination a widely-shared commitment among Senators to in-
dependent-minded review, there is good reason not to do so. Among other things, the 
Senate's rather speedy and unanimous approval of the Scalia and Kennedy nominations in 
1986 and 1988 suggests that the fate of Judge Bork is probably best understood in less sweep-
ing, more case-specific terms. Cf id. at 1225-27 (discussing the Kennedy confirmation pro-
cess); Kaplan, Scalia Was 'Worse' Than Bork, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1987, at A23, col. I 
(criticizing "the Senate's somnambulance when it came to Judge Scalia"). 
142. See supra Part III. 
143. See J. HARRIS, supra note 58, at 303. (Harris counts 20 rejections out of81 nomina-
tions through 1894. If the Senate's actions for the remainder of the 1890s are added in, the 
totals prior to this century were 20 rejections out of 83 nominations. With regard to what 
constitutes a rejection, see supra note 139.) 
144. See generally P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1988). 
